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NATURAL RESOURCES AND NATURAL LAW PART II: THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
Robert W. Adler*
Abstract
Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation
analyzed claims by some western ranchers, grounded in natural law, that
they have property rights in grazing resources on federal public lands
through prior appropriation. Those advocates asserted their position in
part through civil disobedience, sometimes including armed standoffs with
federal officials. They also asserted that their duty to obey theistic natural
law overrode any duty to obey the Nation’s positive law. Similar claims
that individual religious beliefs override positive law have been made
recently regarding a range of other controversial issues, such as same-sex
marriage, public insurance for birth control, and the right to bear arms.
Prior appropriation doctrine is consistent with secular natural law theory.
Existing positive law, however, accepts prior appropriation for western
water rights but rejects its application to grazing rights on federal public
lands, for reasons consistent with secular natural law. Natural law
doctrine allows citizens advocate for change but requires them to respect
the positive law of the societies in which they live. Separation of church
and state also bars natural law claims based on religious doctrine unless
those principles are also adopted in secular positive law.
This sequel addresses claims from the opposite side of the politicalenvironmental spectrum that natural law provides one justification for the
public trust doctrine, and that courts should enforce an atmospheric
public trust to redress catastrophic global climate change. Although some
religious groups have embraced environmental agendas supported by
religious doctrine, public trust claims are secular in origin. Just as natural
law provides support for prior appropriation, it supports the idea that
some resources, such as water, wildlife, and air, should be held in common
rather than made available for private ownership. From this perspective,
the two doctrines merge into a single issue of resource allocation. Which
resources are best made available for appropriation as private property,
and which are best left in common? Natural law theory helps to explain
the liberty and welfare goals that inform those choices. Positive law
embraces the public trust doctrine with respect to some natural resources,
and does not preclude its applicability to the atmosphere or other common
resources.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
This article was made possible in part by the Albert and Elaine Borchard Excellence in
Teaching and Research Fund. I appreciate the very helpful research assistance provided by
Trevor Gruwell and excellent editorial assistance by Angela Turnbow.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation (hereinafter
Prior Appropriation)1 evaluated claims by some western ranchers,2 grounded
partially in natural law, to appropriative property rights to federal public land
resources. This companion article assesses similar natural law origins of the public
trust doctrine, asserted from the opposite side of the political-environmental
spectrum by environmental advocates. Those claims have heightened importance
given litigation arguing that an atmospheric public trust obligates governments to
combat climate change.3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
1 Robert W. Adler, Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation,
60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 739 (2019) (hereinafter Prior Appropriation).
2 Because I do not presume these views to be universal or even a majority position
among western ranchers, I referred to advocates for this position as “natural law ranch
advocates.” See id. at 746-47.
3 For discussions of atmospheric trust litigation and the crisis of catastrophic climate
change it seeks to redress, see, MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 220-29 (2014); Mary Christina Wood
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ordered dismissal of one atmospheric trust case for lack of standing, reasoning that
the alleged harm was redressable only by political branches of government.4
Prior Appropriation concluded that, whether or not one accepts the validity of
natural law in U.S. jurisprudence, it does not support private property rights in
federal public lands based prior appropriation.5 First, even if one believes that
natural law supports property rights in grazing or other resources, personal beliefs
cannot override duly adopted positive law. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prevents any asserted supremacy of religious beliefs over applicable
secular law, without impairing an individual’s right to hold those beliefs under the
Free Exercise clause.6 Moreover, a fundamental tenet of natural law is that, as
members of an ordered society, individuals are bound to obey positive law even if
they disagree with that law.7 The federal and state constitutions are the only means
through which fundamental rights can be used to override positive law rules, and
only through judicial process. Although there is a long tradition of using civil
disobedience to protest perceived injustice, such as slavery, one must accept the
legal consequences of that disobedience in order to employ the tactic.8
Second, although the prior appropriation water law has some natural law
origins,9 all western states ratified the doctrine in their positive law,10 and the federal
government sanctioned their authority to do so.11 With respect to grazing rights on
public lands, by contrast, pursuant to its plenary authority under the Property
Clause,12 the federal government rejected private property rights to federal grazing
resources in favor of a license to graze and later a system of federal permitting. 13

& Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to
Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL L. 259, 263 (2015).
4 Juliana v. United States, __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 254149 (9th Cir. 2020). Other courts
have also dismissed cases involving public trust doctrine implications on atmospheric
conditions. See, e.g., Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1103
(Alaska 2014) (dismissing the case on prudential grounds but mentioning that plaintiffs make
“a good case”); Chernaik v. Brown, 295 Or. App. 584, 600, 436 P.3d 26, 35 (2019) (finding
no conception of the public-trust doctrine in Oregon to impose fiduciary duties on the state
to protect against the effects of climate change).
5 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 804-05.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ….”).
7 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 755 & n.70, 759 & n.92, 779.
8 See id. at 755-56, 779.
9 See id. at 780-86.
10 See id. at 789-93.
11 See id. at 789-92.
12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States ….”).
13 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, Parts II.A.2, II.B.1.b.
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Moreover, it is consistent with natural law principles for the federal government to
categorize different public land and other resources for varying uses.14
Finally, it is debatable whether natural law supports claims to property rights
in federal lands and resources based on historical use. Some scholars believe prior
appropriation was a positive law response to the inadequacy of natural law-based
riparian rights.15 If prior appropriation is a positive law doctrine, natural law cannot
support prior appropriation rights to grazing or other public land resources in
contravention of federal statutes and regulations.
Although ownership and use of federal public lands is an extremely important
but contentious issue that commands significant public attention,16 the question of
the legitimacy and utility of natural law extends well beyond that realm. Similar
natural law-based claims have been made in the context of a wide range of highprofile public debates, including same-sex marriage, public funding of birth control,
and the right to bear arms,17 and in the context of the public trust doctrine.
Prior Appropriation noted that some advocates for broader use of the public
trust doctrine for environmental protection, including climate change mitigation, cite
natural law to support their claims.18 For example, what some courts and scholars
identify as Roman law origins of the doctrine, as summarized in The Institutes of
Justinian19 provides: “By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—
14 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 803-04. This includes res commune or res
publicum for resources believed to be most appropriate for common public use, such as
national parks or wildlife refuges, and res nullius for resources such as water that can be
made available for usufructuary rights so long as the corpus remains unimpaired or not
substantially impaired for public uses such as navigation and fishing.
15 See Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of
Property Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341, 2350-59 (2015); Prior Appropriation,
supra note 1, at 748, 799-801.
16 See Kirk Johnson, Siege Has Ended, but Battle Over Public Lands Rages on, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/us/public-landsbundy-malheur-national-wildlife-refuge.html, (discussing public land controversy in the
west and its implications).
17 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 748-49.
18 See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4
WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 281 (2014); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie,
Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 741 (2012); George P.
Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations
Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 341 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, The
Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987).
19 Some cases incorrectly identify the Institutes of Justinian as a source of law, as if this
work was a formally adopted Roman legal code. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997); Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606, 608 (Nev. 2011);
Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983). It was actually part of
a larger effort by Roman legal scholars, commissioned by Emperor Justinian in Byzantium
toward the end of the Roman Empire (Sixth Century A.D.), to collect the body of Roman
law into a single source. As such, it is more akin to a modern academic legal treatise or
textbook than a legal code. See Bruce W. Frier, The Roman Origins of the Public Trust
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the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.”20 Other
environmental advocates assert inherent or fundamental rights to a clean and healthy
environment grounded similarly in natural law, among other sources.21
Environmental advocates cannot categorically reject natural law as a basis for
property rights claims while simultaneously relying on natural law to support the
public trust doctrine and other asserted environmental rights. To be consistent, these
claims must be subjected to the same analysis and the same scrutiny as natural lawbased claims made by natural law property advocates. To be valid, either the claims
must be supported by duly adopted positive law in ways that are not true for property
rights in federal lands, or they must have a firmer grounding in natural law
principles, while not being contradicted by applicable positive law.
The purpose of this analysis is not to test the legitimacy of the public trust
doctrine, any more than Prior Appropriation questioned the legitimacy of the prior
appropriation doctrine. Prior appropriation clearly exists as a matter of positive
water law in the western states. The issue in Prior Appropriation was the extent to
which natural law supports assertions that it applies to grazing and other public
resources. Likewise, the public trust doctrine has existed in American law at least
since the early nineteenth century.22 It is recognized in positive law (judicial,
legislative, constitutional), but the scope, purpose, and substance of the doctrine
remains hotly disputed.23 The critical question is where and how the doctrine applies,
and whether it should expand to situations not previously recognized. This article
evaluates the extent to which natural law supports such expansion but recognizes
that any change must be implemented through positive law, via judicial evolution of
the common law doctrine or by statute or constitution.
Nor does this analysis revisit the legitimacy of natural law relative to the
predominant modern focus on positive law. That debate has been waged extensively
elsewhere.24 Rather, because some western property rights advocates and some

Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641, 642 (2019); Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long
Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian
Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813, 830-31 (2006). A recent analysis
co-authored by a law professor and a Roman law historian critiqued the same error by legal
scholars, as well as the degree to which citation to the Institutes greatly oversimplifies the
Roman law origins of the doctrine. J.B. Ruhl and Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public
Trust Doctrine: What Was it and Does it Support an Atmospheric Trust?, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440244.
20 J. INST. 2.1.1 (italics added).
21 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, Part II.B.2.
22 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Penn. 1810).
Including colonial cases and ordinances, the pedigree goes back even further. See Ruhl &
McGinn, supra note 19, at 18 & nn. 68, 73 (identifying colonial court decisions applying
English common law trust doctrine).
23 See infra Part II.
24 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (defending legal positivism); LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (defending legal realism). See also, H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.REV. 593 (1958); Lon L.
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environmental advocates both assert legal claims that are potentially grounded in
natural law, this analysis assumes the legitimacy of natural law as the original source
of some kinds of legal rights and obligations.
Part II of this analysis explores competing theories about the legal history and
sources of the public trust doctrine, including common law, constitutional law, and
natural law. Part III analyzes the public trust doctrine according to the principles
identified in Prior Appropriation, and evaluates the implications of the natural law
perspective for the future of the doctrine. Part IV concludes that natural law supports
and is consistent with the public trust doctrine and provides flexibility to apply it to
the atmosphere and other common resources not yet subject to public trust scrutiny.
II. THE MULTIPLE ORIGINS AND SOURCES OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
Legal scholars have disputed the source and origins of the public trust doctrine
extensively, without resolution.25 The debate came in the wake of a now-famous
article by Professor Joseph Sax urging courts to make more assertive use of the
historical public trust doctrine to enhance protection of a range of public resources,26
and intensified after some courts heeded Profession Sax’s call to action.27
At the more restrictive end of the spectrum, some believe the doctrine is a
narrow doctrine of property law applicable only to property underlying navigable

Fuller, Positivism and Fideltiy to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.REV. 630
(1958).
25 See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Matters in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799
(2004); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997); Douglas L. Grant, Western
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 423 (1995); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL L. 425 (1989);
Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law,
19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989); James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine
in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Public
Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and
Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t
Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. L. REV. 511 (1975).
26 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
27 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (dry
sand beaches); Nat’l Audubon Soc., 658 P.2d 709 (non-navigable tributaries); Kootenai Envtl
Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983) (navigable lake).
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waters, thus precluding further expansion to the atmosphere or to other resources.28
Some scholars have proposed that the doctrine is incorporated into parts of the U.S.
Constitution.29 Other authors root the doctrine in a lengthy and diverse legal history,
from the Institutes of Justinian to Magna Carta to Anglo-American common law.30
These legal theories have included the idea that the public trust doctrine has origins
in natural law,31 or that the doctrine is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty. 32 As
shown below, the sovereignty claim flows logically from other tenets of natural
law.33 Others believe the precise source of the doctrine is less relevant than its ability
to fill important gaps in positive law pending an appropriate legislative response.34
The applicable sources of law governing the public trust doctrine may help
inform issues such as the propriety of applying the doctrine to the atmosphere and
other public resources other than navigable waters. They may also be relevant to the
degree to which there is a “floor” on applicability of the doctrine in individual states.
Those issues were raised by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois,35 which upheld an action by the Illinois Legislature
invalidating a previous grant to a railroad company of title to extensive holdings
along the Chicago harbor. The Court grounded its holding in the historic public trust
doctrine, but left unclear the source of law that applied, and whether the ruling was
one of state or federal law.36

28 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y FORUM 1 (2007); Rasband, supra note
25; MacGrady, supra note 25; Lazarus, supra note 25; Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust
Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18; Wilkinson, supra note 25; Epstein, supra
note 25; Michael O’Loughlin, Understanding the Public Trust Doctrine Through Due
Process, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1321 (2017).
30 See, e.g., Sax, supra note 26; Wilkinson, supra note 25; Smith & Sweeney, supra
note 18; Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C.
L. REV. 393 (2009).
31 See supra note 18.
32 See, e.g., MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 3-7 (2013); Torres &
Bellinger, supra note 18, at 291; Wood & Galpern, supra note 3, at 263, 273-78.
33 See infra Part II.E.4.
34 See Babcock, supra note 30.
35 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
36 Plaintiffs sued in state court, but defendants removed to federal court because the
case as plead involved questions regarding construction of a federal statute and federal
constitutional claims. People of the State of Ill. v. Ill. Ctrl. R.R. Co., 16 F. 881, 886-87 (N.D.
Ill. 1888). The decision on the merits, however, did not ultimately turn on federal law.
Although the Court decided the case on what ultimately appeared to be Illinois law, the case
was decided nearly a half century before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
holding that federal courts must defer to state courts on rulings of state law.
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The Supreme Court has since confirmed that each state has authority to
determine the scope and applicability of the public trust doctrine in that state.37 The
Court has never held, however, that states are free to abandon the doctrine,
suggesting that the doctrine has some minimum contours. These issues remain
unresolved, in part, because most state variations in the doctrine reflect policy
differences in the geographic scope of the doctrine,38 or in the specific resources to
which the doctrine applies.39 No state since the Illinois Central case has successfully
eliminated the doctrine40 or curtailed it as substantially as in Illinois Central.41
Ultimately, there is some truth to all of the above theories. The public trust
doctrine has roots in both the civil law tradition of Western Europe dating to the
Roman Empire, and in the Anglo-American common law tradition. Its principles are
consistent with those attributes of natural law that help explain the evolution of
Anglo-American law. The public trust doctrine reached into colonial common law
and statutory law; state constitutional, statutory, and common law; and federal
constitutional, statutory, and common law. Rather than arguing for the dominance
37 Cases confirming this result and post-dating Illinois Central include PPL Montana,
LLC v. Montana, 656 U.S. 576, 604-605 (2012); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469, 475 (1988); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 370-71 (1977); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (noting
that “the conclusion reached [in Illinois Central] was necessarily a statement of Illinois
law….”). The Court had reached the same conclusion before Illinois Central. See Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Packer v. Byrd, 137 U.S. 661 (1891). At times, however,
the Supreme Court has described the public trust doctrine as “American law.” E.g., Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 284-86.
38 Compare Barney 94 U.S. at 325 (following Iowa doctrine that property adjacent to
navigable waters extends only to high water line) with United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Co., 229 U.S. 53, 61 (1913) (applying Michigan doctrine that technical title extends to middle
of stream beneath navigable waters); see also, Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to
the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution
Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOL. L.Q. 53, 58 (2010) (describing considerable
variations in public trust doctrine among western states); Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States,
Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (finding
wide variety of public trust doctrines among eastern states).
39 See supra note 27; see also Craig (Eastern States), supra note 38, at (explaining that
eastern states treat oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes differently than other “navigable
waters”); Craig (Western States), supra note 38, at 78 (examining how western states assign
states property interest in not only the bed of navigable waters but the water itself).
40 The Arizona Legislature attempted to do so by statute regarding most navigable
waters, but that statute was invalidated based on the public trust doctrine and the Arizona
Constitution. Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168-69
(Ariz. 1991); see also San Carlos Apache Tribe v. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
41 In a case somewhat similar to Illinois Central but involving only the right of a railroad
company to wharf out over extensive sections of Lake Erie, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
that the state as trustee may not abandon its trust obligations over significant portions of a
navigable waterway. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 94 Ohio St. 61, 78-80 (1916).
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of one source or another, a more fulsome analysis and explanation of the public trust
doctrine requires an explanation of how each source of authority fits together. Such
an integrated analysis, however, should begin with an exploration of the historical
underpinnings of the doctrine.
B. Historical Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine
There are at least two major historical underpinnings of the American public
trust doctrine. One is based on the civil law tradition of the Roman Empire and parts
of Europe thereafter. The other is grounded in medieval English law, embodied in
Magna Carta and later statutes, which some argue simply restored what the English
nobility viewed as their common law or “ancient” rights pre-dating the Norman
Conquest. The relationship between those roots—and whether and how they
intersect—is less clear. The history and details of both sources, and the degree to
which they actually or appropriately influenced American judges and legislatures,
also remain disputed and unclear. Because American judges are in no way bound by
ancient Roman law or its more recent heirs, that historical root cannot be viewed as
dispositive of the meaning or future of the modern American trust doctrine.
American common law began with the baseline of inherited English common
law at the time of colonial settlement, but every state was free, through its judicial
process, to modify that law as appropriate to its circumstances. Both Roman law and
English common law have been invoked in state and federal jurisprudence, however,
and thus cannot be ignored as an influence on the development of the American
doctrine. The more salient question is the extent to which these historical should be
considered when deciding the future scope and substance of public trust cases.
1. Roman Law
Most American courts finding public trust doctrine roots in Roman law cite to
a brief summary statement in the Institutes of Justinian: “By the law of nature these
things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently
the shores of the sea.”42 This was the first in a series of general rules categorizing
various kinds of property as common, private, or public.43 As explained above, the
Institutes were not a legal codification, but a legal textbook commissioned by
Emperor Justinian in Byzantium, compiling earlier Roman law and accompanying a
much more detailed Digest of Roman legal cases and other authorities.44

J. INST. 2.1.1.
Id. 2.1.1-2.1.6. Section 2.1.2 provided: “rivers and ports are public; hence the right
of fishing in a port is common to all men.” Ensuing sections addressed riverbanks (2.1.4),
and he seashore and the sea (2.1.5).
44 See supra note 19; Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 19, at 13. Some scholars believe
nevertheless that this codification of centuries of Roman law was one of the most important
contributions of the Eastern Empire. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY xvi, 373, 381 (1945).
42
43
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Law professor J.B. Ruhl and Roman history professor Thomas A.J. McGinn
recently critiqued, in an extremely detailed and historically nuanced analysis, what
they view as a gross oversimplification of the degree to which both proponents and
opponents of public trust expansion analyze the influence of Roman law on the
American doctrine.45 Roman law governing ownership and access to rivers,
seashores, and other public resources, and regarding the categorization of property
generally, was considerably more complex than was reflected in the simple
proclamations in the Institutes, and developed over a period of centuries.46 Ruhl and
McGinn suggest that at least two Roman doctrines of property law, the res
communes omnium (“things common to all”)47 and the res publicae (“things in
public use”),48 provide support for the public trust concept. Thus, they conclude,
these doctrines may have influenced later jurists on this issue49 and provided an
historical foundation for what ultimately became the American public trust doctrine,
although not as clearly and as directly as some advocates suggest.50
Even if Roman law addressed issues analogous to the modern public trust
doctrine, however, by what pathway did it influence English or American jurists?
Europe was in legal and political chaos during the centuries following the fall of the
Western Roman Empire.51 Law and governance—to the extent it existed effectively
at all—reflected persistent power struggles between the Roman Catholic Church, the
Holy Roman Empire, emerging free city states, and monarchies that competed for
power until the rise of nations such as France, Spain, and England.52 Any argument
that Roman law proceed in a straight line to England, therefore, seems fanciful.
Moreover, in medieval feudal law and government, sovereignty and “public”
ownership were vested in monarchs and the lesser nobility, not in the people at
large.53 The nobility often retained for themselves exclusive franchises in fisheries

45 See Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 19, at 3-10. Earlier efforts to critique the asserted
Roman origins of the doctrine included McGrady, supra note 25; and Patrick Deveney, Title,
Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Perspective, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).
In fairness to Sax, in his seminal article he acknowledged that the status of Roman law on
this issue was “very confused.” Sax, supra note 26, at 475.
46 See Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 19, at 29-52; see also Frier, supra note 19, at 64247. The Roman Empire, of course, went through multiple systems of governance.
47 See Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 19, at 29.
48 See id. at 52.
49 See id. at 52-56.
50 See id. at 60-61.
51 See generally RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 366-75; NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION:
THE WEST AND THE REST 16-17, 257-59 (2011); see also THOMAS H. GREER & GAVIN
LEWIS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD, 139-177 (6th ed. 1992).
52 See GREER & LEWIS supra note 51, at 209-14; RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 301-07,
478-87.
53 See GREER & LEWIS, supra note 51, at 215-223 (explaining landownership by kings
and lords rather than the people at large); STEWART C. EASTON, THE WESTERN HERITAGE
205-209 (explaining peasants’ use of land and duties owed to a lord).
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and other public resources or granted those rights to favored subjects.54 That was the
antithesis of the public trust.
Nevertheless, Roman law did not simply disappear in the medieval period.55
Scholars have documented public trust concepts deriving from Roman law in the
laws of medieval kingdoms and the evolving European nations,56 although none
appear to trace those continental codes directly to England. Moreover, legal scholars
and theorists continued to write about Roman law concepts of res communes
omnium and res publicae throughout the medieval period and through the
seventeenth century work of Grotius,57 a leading natural law theorist of the
Enlightenment.58 Details of continental trust law varied, just as the doctrine varies
from state to state in the United States.59 The underlying concept however, was
consistent: recognition that some portions of the earth should remain in common.
2. Medieval English Law
It is possible that William the Conqueror imported public trust law to England
in 1066 as part of continental feudal law, which borrowed from Roman law.60 Some
scholars have identified a contemporaneous (eleventh century) French statute
purporting to guarantee open access to “public highways and byways, running water
and springs, meadows, pastures, forest, heaths and rocks…” 61 Eleventh century
Normandy was not yet part of France, however,62 and although it is clear that
William and his successors brought elements of continental feudal law to England,63
evidence that he imported this particular French statute would require considerably
more detailed historical digging.
Moreover, the practice of William and his successors was inconsistent with the
idea of the public trust. One violation of English liberty redressed in Magna Carta
was the practice of Norman monarchs in England to grant exclusive franchises in

See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 50.
See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 302 (preservation of the Roman tradition in Italy,
particularly among the lawyers), 369 (preservation of Roman law by Gothic kings), 429-31
(reliance on Roman law by Holy Roman Emperors in twelfth century), 445 (promulgation
of legal code derived from Roman law by Emperor Frederick II in thirteenth century).
56 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 429 (Spain and France); Lazarus, supra note
25, at 33-34 (Spanish legal codes and others); MacGrady, supra note 25, at 535-45 (Visigoth
code, Spanish code, French law and codes).
57 See Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 19, at 30-33.
58 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 757 & n.83.
59 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 55.
61 See Wilkinson, supra note 25, at n.22.
62 See SIR MAURICE POWICK, THE LOSS OF NORMANDY 1189-1204, STUDIES IN THE
HISTORY OF THE ANGEVIN EMPIRE 8 (2nd ed. 1960) (first published 1913).
63 See Ralph V. Turner, The Making of Magna Carta: The Historical Background, in
MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 17-20 (Daniel Barstow Magraw, Andrea Martinez,
& Roy E. Brownell II, eds. 2014) (describing abuses in England by Angevin kings).
54
55
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navigable waters and fisheries to favored lesser nobility.64 The same was true for
forests in which English people formerly enjoyed free access.65 Magna Carta forced
King John to remove fish weirs that restricted public access to navigable rivers,66
and to remove enclosures adjacent to rivers and forests.67 This also prohibited the
King from granting future exclusive grants.68 Thus, William may have brought
European feudal law to England, but the English barons forced a restoration of preexisting rights, including rights analogous to the public trust doctrine. Of course, this
effort was not fully democratic given that Runnymede was part of a conflict between
King John and the English Barons, not between the nobility and the people.69
The idea of an English public trust doctrine pre-dating the Norman conquest
begs the question as to the origins of that doctrine, but it also could have derived
from Roman law. The Romans ruled large portions of Britain beginning in the
middle of the first century A.D.,70 bringing core principles of Roman law that unified
the Empire.71 That could not have not included the Justinian Institutes, which were
written over a century after Rome withdrew from Britain.72 The Roman public trust
doctrine, however, has roots that can be traced to as early as the second century,73
well within the period of Roman rule. Moreover, classical Roman jurists developed
the law regarding access to water bodies in response to exclusive claims by the
owners of luxury villas,74 and the wealthy in Britain emulated the Roman practice

See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 3, 50-51.
See Nicholas A. Robinson, The Charter of the Forest: Evolving Human Rights in
Nature, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, 311, 311-17 (Daniel Barstow Magraw,
Andrea Martinez, & Roy E. Brownell II, eds. 2014).
66 Magna Carta, §33, available at: https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-cartaenglish-translation# (British Museum translation 2014).
67 Id. §§47, 53.
68 See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 382; Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
69 See Turner, supra note 63; Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, in MAGNA CARTA AND
THE RULE OF LAW xi, xii-xiii (Daniel Barstow Magraw, Andrea Martinez, & Roy E. Brownell
II, eds. 2014); WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL.
I, THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN xv-xi, 185-86 (1956, Bantam ed. 1963). Nevertheless, although
Magna Carta sometimes addresses issues of feudal order and the rights of knights and other
nobles, e.g., Magna Carta, supra note 66, §§4, 21, the liberties spelled out in the charter are
addressed to “all free men of our kingdom” and some of the rights are addressed to a “free
man” or “any man” or anyone. E.g., id. §§27, 28, 30, 39, 40. See O’Connor, supra, at xiii.
70 The perception that Roman occupation began with Julius Caesar a century earlier is
misleading. Julius Caesar mounted two armed incursions into Britain beginning in 55 B.C.
to subdue troublesome tribes, but promptly left without leaving any significant aspects of
Roman rule or civilization. See CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 1-4, 10-12. The invasion that
led to Roman colonization began a century later under Emperor Claudius, see id. at 13-14,
and Roman rule continued until the end of the fourth century. See id. at 13-33.
71 See id. at 21, 26-28, 31.
72 See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 5; CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 31-41.
73 See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 47-49; Frier, supra note 19, at 642.
74 See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 50-51.
64
65
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of building luxury villas.75 Thus, although documentation of the extent to which
Roman law influenced early English common law is sparse,76 and although England
freed itself from rigid adherence to Roman civil law relative to Continental Europe,77
the pre-Norman English public trust may have roots in Roman law.
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine might have evolved independently
in England as part of the common law, based on similar principles that certain lands
and natural resources are shared and not amenable to private ownership. Some
scholars hypothesize that Lord Matthew Hale’s late eighteenth century treatise on
maritime law78 was the first real manifestation of the English public trust doctrine.79
Others trace the English common law roots to Henry de Bracton’s seminal thirteenth
century compilation of English common law.80 Yet Bracton did not write on a clean
slate any more than did the authors of the Institutes of Justinian. His was the first
effort to compile the case law produced by early English jurists into a set of general
“common law” principles.81 The Celtic tribes and others that inhabited Britain before
the Romans arrived and after they left showed a strong history of individual liberty,
without a highly structured central government, and a strong subsistence reliance on

75 See

CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 29.
described the uncertain evolution of English law as “a body of custom
which, whatever its ultimate sources may be–folkright brought from beyond the seas by
Danes, and by Saxons before them, maxims of civil jurisprudence culled from Roman codes–
is being welded into one Common Law.” CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at x-xi. Yet he also
noted that English common law diverged in significant ways from the civil law codes
influenced by Rome. See id. at 163-65. Professor Thomas Lund expressed significant
uncertainty about the degree of influence Roman law had on English common law, See
THOMAS LUND, THE CREATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE MEDIEVAL YEAR BOOKS
DECIPHERED 1-3, 45 (2015), but noted its declining influence when the clerics abandoned
judicial posts because of their reluctance to swear a preference for secular rather than
ecclesiastical doctrine. Id. at 23-34. See also id. at 350-51 (noting differences between
codified law according to Roman methods and case law according to the English common
law method). But see, id. at 223 (documenting influence of Roman doctrine of res judicata).
See also John H. Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench: The Influence of the Jury on English
Conceptions of the Judiciary, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW AND CIVIL LAW FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 69, 72 (Paul Brand & Joshua
Getzler) 2012 (explaining a movement known as “Reception of Roman Law” which took
place in Northern Europe but did not take place in England).
77 See CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at xviii.
78 LORD MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND
(1787).
79 See Cohen, supra note 28, at 251 (arguing that the doctrine only took hold in England
in late eighteenth century based on Hale’s treatise); MacGrady, supra note 25, at 7 (arguing
that the prima facie rule of sovereign ownership was not adopted in England until 1795, by
which time most of the English shoreline was in private ownership).
80 See Huffman, supra note 25, at 545; Lazarus, supra note 25, at 635. The reference is
to Henry de Bracton’s On the Laws and Customs of England. See LUND, supra note 76, at 2.
81 See LUND, supra note 76, at 2.
76 Churchill aptly
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common resources.82 Professor Nicholas Robinson demonstrates that, in creating
Royal Forests, the Norman kings displaced “the customary access of many,
including commoners, to forest areas.”83
Thus, the English public trust doctrine may reflect Roman law during the
Roman occupation, Continental law imported by the Normans, centuries of
customary access to common resources in England, or a combination of the above.
Regardless of the sources, English common law embraces a principle, which as
explained later is consistent with natural law theory,84 that some portions of the earth
are best made available for private ownership, while others are more efficiently or
equitably left in common.
3. Implications for American public trust law
Regardless of the exact status and accuracy of the Justinian compilations or a
more detailed evaluation of the Roman public trust concept, or of the derivation of
the analogous doctrine in English common law, the details are not necessarily critical
to analysis of the American doctrine and its future.85 The basic idea is that some
portions of the earth are amenable to private ownership, while other areas (the air,
running water, the sea, and the seashore, as well as forest and other common
resources) should remain as some form of public commons, or in some form of
public ownership. As one U.S. court noted recently, “Justinian derived the doctrine
from the principle that the public possesses inviolable rights to certain natural
resources.”86 During the period in which American public trust law first developed,
American jurists were accustomed to drawing on multiple sources of authority to
identify the “best” or “true” doctrines that should apply to a particular issue.87 The
following sections evaluate the extent to which public trust principles reflect
common law, constitutional law, and natural law.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine as Common Law
Scholars continue to debate the legal sources and origins of the American public
trust doctrine.88 The lion’s share of judicial authority, however, suggests that it
derived most directly from English common law,89 and was inherited first by the
82 See CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 7-10, 19 (noting “the primary right of men to die
and kill for the land they lived in”), 22 (noting the rebellion of “a vast host of broken, hunted
men resolved on death or freedom”), 24.
83 See Robinson, supra note 65, at 317.
84 See infra Part II.E.3.
85 See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 61.
86 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 608.
87 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 770-73.
88 See supra note 25.
89 See PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 603-04 (although also noting roots in Roman civil
law); Packer, 137 U.S. at 667-68; Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29
(1845); Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609; Ariz. Center for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d at
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British colonies and later by the states that succeeded them,90 or by later-admitted
states under the Equal Footing Doctrine.91 The Nevada Supreme Court, for example,
noted recently that, although the public trust doctrine was “thought to be” traceable
to Roman law, it was clearly “adopted by the common law courts of England ….”92
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that “its principles can be found in the
English common law ….”93
Rooting the public trust doctrine in English common law, however, does not
resolve disagreements regarding the nature and breadth of that authority. Some
scholars argue that, even if the public trust doctrine is a correct statement of English
common law adopted in and modified in American law,94 it simply confirms
government title to a narrow category of lands beneath navigable waters.95 As such,
the doctrine is not appropriately expanded to other resources and functions. Other
scholars suggest that submerged land is simply one example of a broader principle,
and that courts can modify the doctrine to suit new circumstances and to protect
other common resources.96
A related disagreement is the degree to which the government holds title to
lands underlying navigable waters, or other resources, subject to trust limitation.
Some argue that the government holds those resources like other public property,
and can dispose of them subject to applicable positive law.97 Indeed, those scholars
question whether principles of trust law even apply to public resources, despite the
longstanding use of that terminology.98 At the other extreme is the idea that public
trust resources, by their very nature, are unalienable.99 In the middle is a body of

161; Nat’l Audubon Society, 685 P.2d at 718 (although also noting roots in Roman civil law);
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1088 (on rehearing); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441,
454-55 (1850); Carson, 2 Binn. At 477-78, 484.
90 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1894); Illinois Ctrl. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 456 (1892); Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 409-10; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 4953 (1821).
91 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 26-28; Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 222-23.
92 Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609; see also Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest,
837 P.2d at 161 (doctrine “originates in a common-law doctrine, dating back at least as far
as Magna Charta ….”); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1088 (describing doctrine as
“one of the dominant principles of the English common law.”).
93 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 604.
94 Not all scholars agree, arguing that American courts misinterpreted and misapplied
the English doctrine. See James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine is
Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 339-49 (2015).
95 See Lazarus, supra note 25, at 691; Huffman, supra note 25, at 527, 541, 561.
96 See Babcock, supra note 30; Sax, supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 25.
97 See Huffman, supra note 94, at 368-69; Cohen, supra note 28, at 274-76.
98 See Huffman, supra note 25, at 534-41; Lazarus, supra note 25, at 656-68.
99 See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 284-87.
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authority defining or limiting the reasons for which public trust resources can be
privatized,100 by whom,101 to what extent,102 and with what qualifications.103
If these are purely issues of common law, they can be changed through the
positive law of any jurisdiction. First, stare decisis does not prohibit judges from
modifying or even abandoning previous common law doctrines where they no
longer make sense or where they are inconsistent with conditions in a particular
jurisdiction.104 Indeed, American courts have expressly modified English common
law regarding the public trust doctrine when they found particular aspects of that
law inapplicable or unsuited to the conditions in North America.105 Second, as the
100 See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 383-84 (authorizing grants for adequate compensation and
pursuant to plan of harbor improvement in the public interest); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at
453 (allowing grants if “used in promoting the interests of the public” or “for the
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters”); In re Trempealeau Drainage Dist.,
131 N.W. 838, 840-41 (1911) (authorizing draining of wetlands to improve navigation);
Ward v. Mumford, 32 Cal. 365, 372-73 (1867) (authorizing grants to improve navigation as
consistent with the trust); Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (1854) (authorizing plan for
filling lots in San Francisco Bay “to subserve the public good”); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. at
458-59 (authorizing grants for public purposes), 466-68 (noting grants for dams, docks, and
other improvements).
101 See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 382 (authorizing legislative grants); Illinois Central, 146
U.S. at 460 (by the legislature, with reservation of the power of future legislatures to change);
Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 456-58 (authorizing valid grants by legislature acting as representatives
of the people as sovereign.
102 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50 (restricting federal grants of submerged lands held in
trust for states to cases of “some international duty or public exigency”); Illinois Central,
146 U.S. at 451-58 (limiting to discrete parcels but prohibiting for entire public harbor);
Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 459 (not permissible for “all the waters of the state”).
103 See Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. at 62 (qualifying private title to submerged
lands as “subordinate to the public right of navigation” and “the absolute power of Congress
over the improvement of navigable rivers”); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 457-58 (only with
“an implied reservation of the public right”); Martin, 41 U.S. at 411 (requiring that grants
from the trust must be strictly construed); Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 94 Ohio St. at
69 (any state title subject to federal government’s paramount rights of navigability); People
v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 589 (1913) (holding that owners took title subject to
easement servitude for navigation and commerce); Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471, 473
(1871) (prohibiting sales that would materially interfere with navigation).
104 See, e.g., Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 835, 872 (2012) (explaining that precedent sets the groundwork for common law but
must be refined through subsequent decisions); Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 467-69
(explaining applicability of common law flexibility to public trust law).
105 See, e.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-26 (surveying ways in which English common law
trust rule had been modified in U.S. states); Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d at 36566 (expanding public trust protection to dry beaches recognizing modern uses and “the
dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine”); Nat’l Audubon Soc., 688 P.2 at 719-22
(recognizing earlier changes in geographic scope of navigable waters, and expanding
protection to address water diversions from non-navigable tributaries to navigable waters);
Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (expanding trust purposes to include ecological, aesthetic, and
scientific uses and values); Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. 358, 365-67 (1845) (holding English
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elected representatives of the people, legislatures have the authority to modify or
override even longstanding common law doctrines.106
Yet although states have discretion regarding the scope and applicability of the
public trust doctrine,107 no state has successfully108 eliminated it. Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court and state courts suggest that such an effort would be
impermissible.109 No court, however, has articulated a universal baseline for
protection of public trust resources. Moreover, if such a baseline exists, it cannot be
justified on common law grounds alone. Rather it must be grounded either in a
binding principle of constitutional law; or in a fundamental principle of law that is
rooted so deeply in our legal tradition or our concept of natural rights and liberties
that it is immutable. Those possibilities are explored in the following subsections.
D. The Public Trust Doctrine as Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court has held that certain aspects of the public trust doctrine are
governed or influenced by the U.S. Constitution. It is important, however, to
distinguish the specific public trust issues to the Constitution applies from those
aspects of the doctrine governed by common law.
1. Allocation of Trust Authority
In Martin v. Waddell110 and in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan,111 the Supreme Court
clarified that states, not the federal government, hold title to lands underlying
navigable waters. Just as the British Crown as sovereign held title beneath navigable
waters in trust for the British people, the Colonies held that trust on behalf of the
settlers; and after the Revolution, the people of each state became sovereign and held
that trust through their duly elected governments.112 Later-admitted states enjoy the
same rights on an “equal footing” with the original states.113
rule on geographic scope of navigability not suited to conditions in Tennessee); Wilson v.
Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (1828) (holding English tidal rule inapplicable to circumstances in North
Carolina); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (finding English rule
regarding ebb and flow of tide unsuitable to Hudson River).
106 See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (indicating a presumption for
retaining longstanding common law unless a statute overrides plainly and directly).
107 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 40 (describing unsuccessful attempt by Arizona legislature to
relinquish state public trust claims to majority of the state’s navigable waters).
109 See, e.g., Appleby, 271 U.S. at 393; Ill. Central R.R. Co, 146 U.S. at 451-55;
California Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 591; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 49-53.
110 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
111 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
112 Martin, 41 U.S. at 409-16.
113 Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 221-22. The “equal footing” doctrine with respect to
state ownership and control of navigable waters was one application of a general principle,
adopted by Congress in early state Acts of Admission, that new states should be admitted
with the “same rights of freedom, sovereignty, and independence” as existing states. See id.
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In cases delineating the federal navigational servitude,114 however, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution115 as a cession by the
states of that portion of sovereignty necessary to empower the federal government
to protect navigable waters for interstate and international commerce.116 To the
extent that the public trust doctrine protects the common use and preservation of
navigable waters for public uses such as navigation, fishing, and commerce, the
federal navigation servitude divides that trust authority and responsibility between
the state and federal governments.117 When the Supreme Court has addressed
conditions under which states may alienate trust property, it has underscored that
any such dispositions remain subject to the federal navigation servitude.118
Navigable waters are not the only area in which the states ceded some control
over public trust resources to the federal government pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and other constitutional authority. For example, states retain police power
authority to manage and protect wildlife within their territory even though the
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of state “ownership” of wildlife.119 With respect
to wildlife such as interstate and international migratory birds120 and threatened and

at 221. Although the “equal footing” language appears nowhere in no constitutional text, it
implements the State Admission Clause. U.S. CONST., art. IV, §3, cl. 1.
114 See generally Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The
Historical, Yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643, 1676-82 (2013)
(surveying cases).
115 U.S. CONST. art. I §8 c.3.
116 See PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 591 (states gained title to lands beneath navigable
waters “subject only to the ‘paramount power of the United States to control such waters for
purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.’”); see also United States v.
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); United States v. Twin Cities Power Co.,
350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956); Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. at 62-63. This doctrine had
antecedents in Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing plenary federal Commerce Clause
authority over navigable waters. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 (1893); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876); Gilman v. City of
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
117 See Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. at 63 (“Congress possesses all the powers [over
navigable waters] which existed in the states before adoption of the national Constitution,
and which have always existed in the Parliament in England.”).
118 See Chandler-Dunbar Co, 229 U.S. at 60-62 (holding that, when state law confers
technical title to beds of navigable waters to adjacent landowners, title remains subject to the
federal servitude); Shively, 152 U.S. at 14-18 (holding that title to discrete parcels states grant
to private parties remains subject to those rights the states surrendered to federal
government). Accord, Ill. Central R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 465 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
119 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36 (1979) (rejecting state effort to restrict
interstate trade in wildlife as Commerce Clause violation but confirming the state’s police
power authority over wildlife). Earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld state efforts to restrict
interstate wildlife exports as sovereigns who hold wildlife in trust for their people. Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896).
120 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-35 (1920) (upholding Migratory Bird
Treaty Act pursuant to federal power to enter into and enforce treaties with foriegn nations).
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endangered species,121 however, the states ceded to the federal government some
level of trust responsibility and authority as well. Arguably, the same is true for
protection of atmospheric resources. Although states have authority and
responsibility as parens patriae to protect common resources from air pollution,122
the Clean Air Act123 reflects the federal government’s authority to redress interstate
pollution and pollution that otherwise affects interstate commerce.124
In addition, where the federal government held lands in territorial status prior
to the creation of new states, despite its “plenary authority” over public lands125
under the Property Clause,126 it held lands underlying navigable waters in trust for
future states.127 This preserved the rights of future states to be admitted on an equal
footing with the original states and all other previously admitted states. Thus, under
multiple provisions of the Constitution, the federal government held pre-statehood
sovereign lands subject to two distinct, but related, trusts. First, it held those lands
in trust for the future states themselves. Consistent with that trust, any alleged
conveyances of sovereign lands to other parties were subject to strict judicial
scrutiny and a presumption against such conveyances absent clear indications to the
contrary.128 Second, until those states were admitted, the federal government that
held those lands as sovereign, bound itself by the traditional public trust doctrine.129
2. Substance of the Public Trust Doctrine
None of the above principles of constitutional law dictate or authorize the
federal government to dictate the substance of the public trust doctrine. There are
three ways, however, in which federal constitutional provisions potentially implicate
the substance of the public trust doctrine.
First, although the Commerce Clause is the constitutional vehicle through
which the states conceded part of their public trust authority and responsibility to
the federal government,130 it also grants substantive authority to Congress. 131
121 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1134
(upholding applicability of Endangered Species Act to intrastate population of red wolves
based on tourism and other interstate impacts).
122 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (affirming state power
to redress interstate air pollution to protect the shared resources of its citizenry, including air,
forests, and agricultural resources).
123 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.
124 See Connecticut v. E.P.A., 696 F.2d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 1982)).
125 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Prior Appropriation,
supra note 1, at 750.
126 U.S. CONST. art IV, §3, cl.2.
127 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 28-31; Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183-84
(1891); Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 222-23.
128 See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272-73 (2001).
129 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50.
130 See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
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Nothing in the text of the Commerce Clause, however, expressly invokes the public
trust doctrine, much less instructs Congress about how to exercise such authority.
This is logical given that the cession of public trust authority is simply one of many
areas in which the states, in adopting the Commerce Clause, ceded authority over
interstate and international commerce. Moreover, the Commerce Clause provides no
additional substantive guidance regarding the many other spheres in which it
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. At a minimum,
however, it limits the scope of federal authority to enforce the public trust doctrine
to those issues that fall within the reach of Commerce Clause power.
Second, by making state alienation of public trust resources subject to residual
federal authority under the Commerce Clause and the federal navigational servitude,
the U.S. Constitution becomes one way to impose a floor on the public trust doctrine.
The Commerce Clause and the federal navigational servitude ensure that public trust
protection of common public resources—at least those affecting interstate and
foreign commerce—depends on application of public trust principles by both the
states and the federal government. Thus, it provides a second line of defense with
respect to those public trust resources involving interstate and foreign commerce.
The Property Clause of the Constitution also potentially influences the federal
government’s administration or supervision of sovereign public trust resources.132
For two seemingly opposite but ultimately consistent reasons, however, the Property
Clause lacks any substantive standards governing the use and management of public
trust resources. With respect to public lands generally, the Property Clause grants
Congress “plenary authority,” that is, unfettered discretion to determine how that
property best serves the public interest, including the grant or sale of those lands to
others.133 If public trust resources are viewed as part of the nation’s property just like
any other, Congress would have discretion to alienate that property. Congress could
abandon public trust resources entirely, a result the Supreme Court did not sanction
with respect to state public trust resources in Illinois Central and other cases.134 The
Property Clause as interpreted generally, therefore, appears to provide no
substantive constraints on the federal government’s disposition of trust resources.
Just as states hold sovereign lands in a different capacity from other public
property, however, the federal government exercises Commerce Clause and
navigational servitude authority in a manner distinct from its management of public
lands generally. With respect to pre-statehood sovereign lands, the Equal Footing
doctrine obligated the federal government to manage public trust resources in the
same capacity as any future state, and to preserve them in trust for future states.135
With respect to sovereign lands held by states, the Commerce Clause and the federal
navigational servitude confer residual authority to protect and manage those
132 U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
and Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”).
133 See supra note 132.
134 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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resources for the traditional public trust uses of commerce and navigation.136 Neither
the Equal Footing Clause nor the Commerce Clause, however, delineate substantive
principles regarding the exercise of the trust.
Thus, one must look elsewhere to find substantive rules or constraints on state
and federal use, protection, and disposition of public trust resources. The third
potential constitutional vehicle for doing so is the Ninth Amendment.137 Debate
continues, however, regarding the extent to which the Ninth Amendment is an
independent source of unenumerated rights, and if so, the appropriate source of those
rights.138 I assumed a positive answer to that question in analyzing natural law
support for prior appropriation, and do so here as well. If the legal rules governing
the public trust doctrine are simply a matter of state and federal common law, they
can be changed via common law process or by statute. Unless the government’s duty
as sovereign to maintain and protect those resources protects fundamental rights
rooted so deeply in our legal tradition that they are viewed as inalienable, and thus
“retained by the people.” That possibility is explored next.
E. The Public Trust Doctrine as Natural Law
Courts have used language sounding in natural law to support the public trust
doctrine, either expressly or by implication. That was true most often at times when
natural law was most prominent in U.S. jurisprudence,139 but recent judicial
decisions have also invoked natural law to support public trust principles.140
Particularly in the early nineteenth century, however, U.S. judges cited natural law
to bolster decisions also based on common law, statutes, or constitutions. 141
Other legal scholars have also addressed the relevance of natural law to the
public trust doctrine, although from different perspectives than I present below.
Some reach conclusions similar to mine, but others are considerably different.142 In
an early treatment of the issue based on libertarian theory, Richard Epstein adopts a
consequentialist view143 in which he asks what set of rules best promote and correct
136 See

supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
138 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 777-78.
139 See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 49-50 (1821); and see Prior Appropriation, supra note
1, at 771-74 (identifying when natural law was most predominant in U.S. jurisprudence).
140 See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.2d 901, 947-48
(Pa. 2013). Other recent judicial opinions courts have invoked natural law indirectly by citing
the Institutes of Justinian quoted above. See, e.g., Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 608; National
Audubon Soc., 658 P.2d at 718.
141 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 772 & n.180.
142 I exclude from this list the very useful survey conducted by Blumm and Guthrie of
public trust doctrines in other nations, some of which rely on natural law, because that
analysis identified natural law sources but did not propose a theoretical framework based on
those examples. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 18.
143 Epstein, supra note 25, at 412 n.1 (“what general set of legal institutions will advance
the welfare of the public at large”).
137 U.S.
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voluntary transactions, and what role government should play in protecting common
property from government intrusion.144 He ultimately adopts the view that any
property held in common in the “original position” that pre-dated civil society
warrants public trust protection.145 George Smith and Michael Sweeney reach a
nearly opposite conclusion, arguing for a much more restrictive application of the
public trust doctrine,146 based on a significantly theistic view of natural law that has
no place in American law.147 Gerald Torres and Nathan Bellinger argue that the
public trust reflect pre-existing or inherent rights that are “merely secured by
government” and hence are “the chalkboard on which the Constitution is written.” 148
As argued in Prior Appropriation, in a society governed by positive law, natural
law alone cannot support a consequential legal doctrine, particularly where duly
enacted positive law provides otherwise.149 To that extent, I agree with Professor
Huffman that unbounded reliance on vague principles of natural law to disrupt
settled legal expectations is inconsistent with democracy.150 Individuals and
governments are bound to obey positive law even if it conflicts with their views
about what is just, under principles of natural law or otherwise. That is particularly
true in the United States with respect to theistic sources of natural law, given
constitutionally mandated separation of church and state,151 absent a parallel in
secular law.152 That limitation, however, does not make natural law reasoning
irrelevant to the history and evolution of the public trust doctrine, particularly when
properly bounded by checks and balances and other institutional constraints.153
1. Natural Law in American Public Trust Jurisprudence
Natural law principles can inform or support a legal doctrine adopted via
positive law. They can guide judicial analysis of common law issues of first
impression.154 They can influence judicial exercise of equitable doctrines by
shedding light on what is just from an historical perspective.155 They can serve as a
benchmark to determine whether a statute offends fundamental rights protected by

144 See

id. at 413-14.
id. at 428.
146 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 18.
147 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
148 See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 288.
149 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779.
150 See Huffman, supra note 25.
151 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
152 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779-80. For example, the Biblical
Commandment that there is only one God is purely religious, whereas the prohibition against
murder is a universally recognized principle of law. See id. at n.66 and accompanying text.
153 See infra Part III.B.
154 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 771-72.
155 See id. at 772-73.
145 See
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the Ninth Amendment, although the debate continues about the precise standards
that apply, and the appropriate sources of those standards.156
Early American courts cited natural law to bolster analysis of the English public
trust doctrine. Most notably, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick relied heavily on natural law
in his opinion in Arnold v. Mundy,157 arguably the most influential early state court
public trust decision.158 In analyzing the grant from King Charles II to the Duke of
York establishing the East Jersey settlement, Justice Kirkpatrick wrote:
If we shall find some things contained in it, which by the laws of England,
as well as of all other civilized countries, and even by the very law of
nature itself, are declared to be the common property of all men, then, by
every fair rule of construction, we are to consider these things as granted
to him, as the representative of the sovereign, and as a trustee to support
the title for the common use ….159
Moreover, Justice Kirkpatrick relied heavily on natural law in articulating what may
be the most frequently quoted portion of his holding, and elsewhere in his opinion:
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the
principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered
society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state,
divesting all citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance which
could never be long borne by a free people.160
Consistent with the practice of the time to cite natural law as part of a multi-faceted
analysis,161 Chief Justice Kirkpatrick relied on natural law along with other sources
(both civil law and common law) to justify his holding.162
See id. at 777-78.
N.J.L. 1 (1821).
158 Courts often cite Illinois Central as the seminal or “lodestar” case in U.S. public
trust jurisprudence, see, e.g., Kootenai Envt’l Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1088-89; Nat’l Audubon
Soc., 658 P.2d at 718, although one U.S. Supreme Court decision confers that honor on
Shively v. Bowlby. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 473. Arnold v. Mundy predated
all of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases, however, and the Supreme Court relied on
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s reasoning as early as Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 43-44, and in
both Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456, and in Shively, 152 U.S. at 14-18.
159 6 N.J.L. at 49 (italics added).
160 Id. at 53 (italics added). See also id. at 49 (“Of [the kind of property common to all
citizens] according to the writers upon the law of nature and of nations, and upon the civil
law, are the air, the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts.”); 50 (property
“destined for the common use and immediate enjoyment of every individual citizen,
according to his necessity, being the immediate gift of nature to all men, and, therefore, called
the common property”) (italics in original).
161 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 772.
162 6 N.J.L. at 52 (“On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that by the law of nature,
which is the only true foundation of all the social rights; that by the civil law, which formerly
156

157 6
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Other early state courts relied on natural law to explain the public trust
doctrine,163 although not universally.164 Some state courts rooted public trust
principles in natural rights that formed a key part of Enlightenment political theory,
even without using the term “natural law.”165 Even in modifying the result in Arnold
v. Mundy by clarifying that the state legislature had power to dispose of discrete trust
resources where consistent with the purposes of the trust, the New Jersey Supreme
Court continued to rely on natural law principles among other factors.166
The U.S. Supreme Court also relied on natural law in its early public trust
jurisprudence. For example, although Justice Thompson dissented from the result in
Martin v. Waddell, he agreed with the basic natural law principle supporting the state
trust doctrine, paraphrasing Chief Justice Kirkpatrick’s words:
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the
principles of the laws of nature, and the constitution of a well-ordered
society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state,
divesting all the citizens of a common right. It would be a grievance which
could never be long borne by free men.167
Likewise, in Illinois Central, Justice Field quoted with approval those portions of
Arnold v. Mundy citing “the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered
society.”168 Other references to natural law in the Supreme Court’s nineteenth
century public trust jurisdiction are more subtle, but nevertheless grounded in natural
law reasoning.169

governed almost all the civilized world, and which is still the foundation of the polity of
almost every nation in Europe, that by the common law of England ….” navigable waters
are common to all citizens).
163 See, e.g., Palmer, 3 Cai. at 320 (referring to principles ex jure naturae [from natural
law] as governing rights to divert streams).
164 See Carson, 2 Binn. At 484-87 (extending state ownership to beds of waters
navigable in fact rather than those influenced by the ebb and flow of the tides, modifying
English common law to suit geography of Pennsylvania); Eldridge, 4 Cal. at 87 (rooting
early California public trust law in “the law of nations, and the common and civil law”).
165 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cash.) 53, 67-68, 70 (1851) (rooting
public rights to navigable waters in Massachusetts in traditional English liberties as used in
Magna Carta, the Declaration of Rights, and similar principles of English law).
166 Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 456-57 (acknowledging that legislature is not omnipotent in
exercising trust discretion because constrained by constitutional provisions and because its
“powers are abridged by fundamental laws”); see also id. at 459 (quoting with approval
statement in Arnold rejecting state’s ability to make absolute grants to all state waters
“consistently with the laws of nature”).
167 Martin, 421 U.S. at 420 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
168 Illinois Central R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456.
169 See, e.g., The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 458 (1851)
(applying congressional determination of navigability more generally because those
distinctions “are founded in truth and reason”).
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The Supreme Court most expressly relied on natural law, however, to support
its holding that sovereigns have a trust responsibility to manage common wildlife
resources for the benefit of the public at large.170 Tracing the origins of the common
ownership doctrine to Roman law, in which wild animals are designated as “ferae
naturae, which, having no owner, were considered as belonging in common to all
the citizens of the state,”171 Justice White wrote:
There are things which we acquire the dominion of, as by the law of nature,
which the light of natural reason causes every man to see, and others we
acquire by the civil law; that is to say, by methods belonging to the
government. As the law of nature is more ancient, because it took birth
with the human race it is proper to speak first of the latter. (1) Thus, all the
animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air,--that is
to say, wild animals,--belong to those who take them … because that
which belongs to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who
first possesses it.172
Justice White explained why state regulation of wildlife was consistent with this
natural law theory,173 and how those principles were adopted as positive law both in
European civil codes174 and in English common law.175 He concluded:
While the fundamental principles upon which the common property in
game rest have undergone no change, the development of free institutions
had led to the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in
the state, resulting from this common ownership, is to be exercised, like
all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, or
for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public
good.176
In his dissent in Geer, Justice Field also rooted his decision in natural law
regarding ownership of resources that are not the property of anyone “until they are
brought into subjection or use by the labor or skill of man,” and “[t]hat which
belongs to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the first person who possesses
it.”177 Justice Field’s dissent was not based on any disagreement with the
fundamental principle that wildlife is a common resource held in trust by the
government as sovereign until individual animals are reduced to private ownership.
170 Geer,

161 U.S. 519 (1896).
at 522.
172 Id. at 523 (italics added).
173 Id. at 524.
174 Id. at 526 (citing articles 714 and 715 of the Napoleonic Code).
175 Id. at 526-27 (quoting Blackstone’s analysis of the natural law basis for a public trust
in common resources such as light, air, water, and animals).
176 Id. at 529.
177 Id. at 539 (Field, J., dissenting).
171 Id.
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Rather, he would have rejected as a Commerce Clause violation the position that a
state could exercise the trust to the exclusion other states.178 To support that
constitutional position, however, he continued to rely on natural law, arguing that
exclusionary state regulation “would convert [wildlife] from the freedom of use
which belongs to property in general to the limited use of the persons or communities
where found ….”179 In other words, exclusive state trust ownership did more to
restrict than to promote the common liberty supported by natural law.
Likewise, when the Supreme Court overruled the state “ownership” doctrine of
Geer based on the same objections raised by Justice Field in his dissent, 180 it did
nothing to reject the principle that wildlife is a shared resource that is incapable of
“ownership”, either by an individual or by the state. Rather, it referred to state
“ownership” as a legal fiction to justify the state’s legitimate interest in regulating
and protecting wildlife for common benefit. As a matter of federalism, the
constitutional treatment of wildlife under Hughes is no different than the Supreme
Court’s treatment of navigable waters discussed earlier.181 States have responsibility
to manage and protect wildlife as a shared resource for the benefit of their citizens,
just as states have responsibility to do so with respect to navigable waters. But in
ratifying the Constitution, states ceded that portion of their sovereignty regarding
wildlife as necessary to empower the federal government to regulate and protect
wildlife in interstate and foreign commerce.
The key difference between wildlife and navigable waters, which is immaterial
to the basic concept of protecting the common resource rather than allowing it to be
privatized, is in the positive law implementation of the natural law principle. With
respect to stationary beds of navigable waters it makes sense to provide that the state
as sovereign holds jus publicum title on behalf of the public at large, subject to the
federal government’s superior authority to regulate navigability for Commerce
Clause purposes. “Ownership” makes little sense with respect to a non-stationary
resource such as wildlife,182 but public trust authority and responsibility remains.
Consistent with the decline in the use of natural law by American judges
beginning in the twentieth century, and its replacement by legal positivism as the
primary mode of legal analysis,183 modern public trust cases have largely abandoned
the overt natural law trappings that characterized earlier cases. In at least two
respects, however, modern public trust jurisprudence retains its roots in natural law.
First, modern cases continue to cite Roman law as foundational, 184 and that law
refers to “the law of nature.”185 Second, in referring to the doctrine as an “ancient
178 Id.

at 538, 541.
at 542.
180 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 329-36 (citing Justice Field’s dissent in Geer).
181 See supra Part II.D.1.
182 See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (“To put the claim of the State upon
title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and
possession is the beginning of ownership.”).
183 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 774-76.
184 See supra note 140.
185 J. Inst. 2.1.1
179 Id.
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doctrine of common law,” courts implicitly recognize that early common law was
influenced strongly by natural law.186
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently adopted natural law
reasoning in construing the state’s constitutional environmental rights provision. In
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the Court described the Declaration of
Rights in Article I of Pennsylvania’s Constitution as “the terms of the social contract
between government and the people that are of such ‘general, great and essential’
quality as to be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’”187 It then described those as “inherent in
man’s nature and preserved rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution.” 188
Despite the fact that the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment189 was
adopted long after the initial adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 190 the Court
deemed it as “[a]mong the inherent rights of the people.”191
By now, American public trust jurisprudence has developed a firm footing in
the nation’s positive law, both through the common law192 and to some extent
through the Commerce Clause and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 193 As
shown above, however, it also has roots in natural law reasoning. Analysis of those
natural law roots remains important in deciding two important legal issues: first,
whether states have the authority to eliminate the doctrine or to curtail it
substantially; and second, the extent to which the that doctrine is limited to the beds
of navigable waters, and whether it is legitimate for states to expand the doctrine to
protect other resources. As shown below, natural law provides support or
explanatory context for both the Roman public trust doctrine and the public trust
doctrine as it developed in English common law.
2. Greco-Roman Natural Law and the Roman Public Trust Doctrine
Early Greek philosophers debated the value of public versus common property
in a well-ordered society, often arguing against extensive private property in favor
of a sharing of common resources.194 This is perhaps most notable Plato’s Utopia195
but also in the work of other Greek philosophers who questioned the merit of
186 See

Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d at 166.
Twp., 83 A.3d at 947.
188 Id. at 640-41.
189 PA. CONST. art. I, §27.
190 For a detailed history and interpretation of amendment, see John C. Dernbach,
Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretive Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICKINSON L. REV. 693 (1999).
191 83 A.3d at 948.
192 See supra Part II.C.
193 See supra Part II.D.
194 Any discussion of egalitarianism in Greek philosophy, of course, must recognize
that equal rights were limited to citizens or others in the privileged class, with others
relegated to un-propertied slave or servant status. See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 74.
195 See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 111. It is also an attribute of Thomas More’s Utopia,
written in the sixteenth century. See id. at 519.
187 Robinson
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unrestricted private property.196 Aristotle favored private property,197 however, and
the Romans ultimately adopted a system of private property.198 The fact that Roman
law supports private property in general, however, does not presumptively conflict
with the Roman public trust doctrine any more than our system of private property
conflicts with the American public trust doctrine. Both are consistent with the idea
that private property should not necessarily apply to all resources, and that some are
more valuable if held in common.
Although there were antecedents,199 natural law manifested most prominently
in Stoic philosophy during the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries
A.D.200 Stoicism rejected chance, believing that “the course of nature is rigidly
determined by natural laws.”201 This idea also had a theistic foundation. The Stoics
believed that order “was ordained by a Lawgiver who was also a beneficent
Providence.”202
Facially, Stoic natural law might appear to have little direct relevance to
property law. Stoicism focuses on individual behavior and virtue rather than on
property and the relationship between the individual and the state.203 Individuals
196 See id. at 231 (Cynics), 252 (Stoics). But see id. at 243, 246 (contrary view of
Epicurians).
197 See id. at 188-89.
198 See WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 182 (2d ed. 1932)
(explaining that wealth or private property could be held in several forms).
199 See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 11 (noting the influence of the concept of fate on
Greek thought, suggesting it as a source of natural law), 27 (discussing early Greek concept
of justice as dictated by a natural law that sets eternal boundaries), 114 (explaining the
influence of fate or necessity on the concept of justice in Plato’s Republic) (1945). See also
Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto or an Appeal from the Old Jurisprudence to the
New, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2012) (quoting Aristotle’s view that “law sprang
from the nature of only one kind of creature”); Daniel R. Heimbach, Natural Law in the
Public Square, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 685, 689-91 (2008) (discussing natural law theories of
Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero); Robert P. George, Natural Law, the
Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269,
2269 (2001) (tracing natural law theory to Aristotle); Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the
Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 41-44
(1997) (tracing natural law theory from Greek philosophers through the Catholic tradition);
Note, Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 n.7 (1957) (noting natural
law roots from Greece and Rome, including the Justinian Institutes).
200 See infra Part II.E.2.
201 RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 254. This derives from the scientific philosophy of the
atomists that nothing happens by chance; everything obeys natural laws. Id. at 66.
202 Id. at 254.
203 See id. at 177 (distinguishing between Stoic rejection of materialism in favor of
virtue and democratic idea that equality and justice must also include power and property).
Any reference to “Greek philosophy,” of course, must reflect that it was, itself, extremely
diverse. For example, although Plato pre-dated the stoics by several centuries, his Utopia
advocated an authoritarian system and envisioned only limited private property. See id. at
108, 113-15, 119. The cynics rejected the idea of private property altogether. See id. at 231.
Aristotle took an intermediate view: “Property should be private, but people should be so
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have freedom, but only to the extent that they seek virtue and ignore matters of
individual well-being—including property—which are dictated externally.204 The
closest idea conceptually to the Enlightenment view of a “social contract” between
individuals and government may be Cicero’s justification of the expansion of the
Roman Empire as a “natural duty to assemble as many as possible into a single
community ‘associated with a common acknowledgement of moral right.’”205 That
political rationale for unifying the known world into a single empire, however, said
nothing directly about property rights.
Moreover, to the extent that Stoic natural law doctrine relies on a theistic
underpinning, it suffers from the same limitation as other religiously grounded tenets
of natural law. The Constitution prohibits the government from adopting law based
solely on religious principle. Moreover, modern secular sensibility does not typically
sanction the idea that God (or a divine “Lawgiver”) has so fixed the course of events
through natural law that individuals have little or no control over their fate.
Yet Roman Law scholars link the Roman public trust doctrine to natural law.
The Institutes of Justinian expressly use the words “by the law of nature.” In
addition, Frier notes that the Institutes describe natural law as prior to civil law of
individual states, and that the notion of res communes “antedate[s] the emergence of
civil government, which through law gradually establishes and protects other types
of property, but … leaves certain things (the air, the sea, the seashore, larger rivers)
in their original, pre-legal condition.”206 This is similar to later Enlightenment
theories about the evolution of property from pre-state to state status.207
Moreover, according to at least one historian of philosophy, the Stoics
influenced the evolution of natural law and natural rights during the Enlightenment:
The doctrine of natural right, as it appears in the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, is a revival of a Stoic doctrine,
though with important modifications. It was the Stoics who distinguished
jus naturale from jus gentium. Natural law was derived from first
principles of the kind held to underlie all general knowledge. By nature,
the Stoics held, all human beings are equal. Marcus Aurelius, in his
trained in benevolence as to allow the use of it to be largely common. Benevolence and
generosity are virtues, and without private property they are impossible.” Id. at 188-89. For
a contemporary example of the degree to which Stoicism focuses on the individual, see
generally RYAN HOLLIDAY & STEPHEN HANSELMAN, THE DAILY STOIC, 366 MEDITATIONS
ON WISDOM, PERSEVERANCE, AND THE ART OF LIVING 2016).
204 See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 254-55. TheSstoics defined “virtue” as “a will which
is in agreement with Nature.” Id. at 254. But see Frier, supra note 19, at n.16 (indicating that
later Stoics “were actually strong proponents of private property and appropriation”).
205 See Heimbach, supra note 199, at 691; see also BUCKLAND, supra note 198, at 185
(explaining debate on extent to which rivers were public under Roman Law).
206 Frier, supra note 19, at 642-43. See also Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 36-37
(linking the Roman public trust doctrine to “a very early period in human experience, the
Golden Age, when no property was held in private, but all in common”).
207 See infra Part III.E.3.
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Meditations, favours ‘a polity in which there is the same law for all, a
polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of
speech, and a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom
of the governed.208
Thus, in the face of centuries of Greco-Roman history in which privileges were
reserved for an elite class of nobles or wealthy citizens and merchants, Stoic natural
law established the idea of natural rights and human equality. To the extent that the
public trust doctrine supports equal access by all members of a society to common
resources as a matter of fundamental rights (as opposed to economic efficiency), as
explained in the following section, this was a critical evolution.
3. Enlightenment Natural Law and the English Public Trust Doctrine
Natural law in the enlightenment supports the English public trust more clearly
than is true with respect to Stoic natural law and the Roman public trust because the
relationship between individuals and their governments is better reflected in
Lockean notions of private versus public property.209 This is important because
American courts inherited public trust law from English common law, irrespective
of whether Roman civil law had any influence on English public trust law.210
Natural law in the Enlightenment is not based primarily on theistic sources.211
It relies on reason to deduce the theoretically optimal relationship between
individuals and the state.212 The theory begins with hypothetical pre-political

208 RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 270. Russell believed that the “self-evident” truths in the
Declaration of Independence reflected the application to political rights of the idea of selfevident maxims in mathematics from Greek geometry. Id. at 36.
209 See, e.g., Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 781, 800; Epstein, supra note 15, at
2346; Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOL. L.Q. 631, 636-37
(1996); Morton J. Horowitz, The History of Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1424 (1982). But see Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the
Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 60 (1998) (arguing that “NeoLockeans” have lulled environmentalists into use of Lockean ideas).
210 See supra Part II.B.
211 It would have been perilous for Reformation and Enlightenment writers to
disassociate themselves entirely from religion. See generally Peter Laslett, Introduction, in
JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press. ed., Peter
Laslett, ed. 1988) (detailing the political and religious constraints Locke faced in writing the
Two Treatises and other works). Often, they cited and analyzed religious text to refute
theories such as the divine right of kings supported by others, as was true, for example, for
Locke’s entire first treatise. See LOCKE, supra, Book I (containing detailed refutation, based
Biblical text, of Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of the divine right of kings).
212 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 757-60; LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II,
ch. 2, §12 (asserting that there is a law of nature based on reason); ch. 6, §57 (asserting that
freedom depends on the law of reason).
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societies,213 which Locke and others called “the state of nature,”214 and then
speculates about the agreements, or “social contracts,” reached by individuals and
their rulers in establishing governments.215 Individuals in the state of nature enjoyed
“perfect freedom,” or liberty, and “perfect equality,” because no government existed
to restrict freedom to take whatever action was consistent with the well-being of
individuals or their family or other group.216 This included unlimited access to the
“commons” for purposes of hunting, fishing, gathering, and other activities
necessary for subsistence.217 In this sense, perfect liberty for all was perfectly
egalitarian, but inconsistent with private property because that would limit the ability
of anyone but a property owner to engage in hunting, fishing, foraging, and other
subsistence activities without trespassing.
This hypothetical state of nature and its unrestricted liberty was feasible under
conditions of low population density and a largely hunter-gatherer economy. As
human societies grew and evolved, however, several fundamental problems

213 It is not clear whether any of the liberal theorists of the Enlightenment believed
literally that early societies acted in the ways they described, as opposed to using
hypotheticals to describe and explain their views of more perfect governments. See RUSSELL,
supra note 44, at 550 (describing Hobbes’s Leviathan as presenting “an explanatory myth”
to explain why people accept government with its limits on freedom). Recent science
suggests that humans began to band into primitive societies extremely early in history, see
YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS 22-28 (2015), but also note that early human societies varied
dramatically in their social order and forms of governance. See id. at 42-45.
214 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 2; see also RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 550
(describing Hobbes’ description of the “state of nature”).
215 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 8 (describing the beginning of political
societies). See also RUSSELL, supra note 44 at 550 (describing Hobbes’s description of the
“social contract”). Hobbes differed from Locke and later Rousseau in arguing that the social
contract was between individuals agreeing to cede all power to a ruler, thus supporting his
views of absolute monarchy. Locke and Rousseau, by contrast, believed the contract was
between individuals and their government, thus preserving rights for individuals and
preserving the rights of citizens to rebel against their government for violation of the contract.
See RUSSELL, supra note 44, at 551. The degree to which any such “agreements” came in the
form of overt discussion and understanding, as opposed to tacit acknowledgment or
acceptance, is obviously a matter of sheer speculation and likely varied widely across
cultures and societies. More formal and clearly conscious written agreements, in the form of
written constitutions or other governance agreements, came much later in history. See, e.g.,
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 947-48 (explaining that Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution
reflected a “social contract” between the people and the Commonwealth regarding
fundamental rights that had been reserved).
216 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 2, §4; See also RUSSELL, supra note 44, at
550.
217 See Freyfogle, supra note 209, at 633; CHURCHILL, supra note 69, at 7 (describing
use of common forests and other resources for hunting and fishing in early Britain); RUSSELL,
supra note 44, at 634 (noting that the poor status of rural laborers in Locke’s time was
mitigated by the commons, to which people had important rights); Robinson, supra note 65.
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suggested the need for some form of government authority218 in which individuals
agreed to cede some freedom in return for solutions to those problems. The key
question was the degree of liberty individuals were likely willing to concede, and in
return for what protections or other services from the government? A fundamental
tenet of liberal natural law theory was that individuals would not relinquish liberty
absent sufficient offsetting benefits.219 Some of those problems—and their
solutions—are particularly relevant to the evolution of the public trust doctrine.
First, perfect freedom works until there is conflict between two or more
individuals, competing for the same resource or otherwise. Natural law theorists
postulated that pre-society individuals were bound by a “Law of Nature … which
obliges every one,” and instructing that “being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”220 To prevent or
redress violations of this fundamental rule, individuals could resort to self-help,
grounded in the natural right to self-defense and self-preservation and the obligation
to “preserve the rest of Mankind.”221 Locke and others recognized, however, that a
society in which individuals judge their own cause is inherently problematic.222
Thus, it made sense to forego the perfect liberty reflected in self-help in return for a
system of impartial justice.
Applying this concept to the public trust doctrine, competition for resources
intensified as human population density increased and as economies shifted from
hunter-gatherer to agricultural and later commercial and industrial.223 Beginning
with a theistic perspective, Locke suggested that God gave the Earth to humanity in
common, along with all of the fruits of nature.224 He then reasoned, however, that
people must be able to appropriate resources to subsist, 225 and that individuals or
groups were not likely to invest their labor and capital in farming or other endeavors
involving individual parcels of land or other resources absent security of
ownership.226 That led to Locke’s famous maxim that private property is justified
when an individual, through labor or other investment, adds value to a previously

218 Social contract theory is irrespective of form of government. People could cede
rights to a monarch, an autocracy, or a constitutional republic in return for the benefits of a
stable government.
219 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 2, §13 (the test of government is how much
better it is than the state of nature), Book II, ch. 3, §21 (justifying government to avoid a
“state of war” between individuals); Book II, ch. 9 (explaining reasons people agree to enter
civil society). This entire idea, of course, presumes that individuals always had significant
choice in the matter in the face of physical, economic, or other power imbalances.
220 LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 2, §6.
221 Id., Book II., ch.2, §§ 6-7.
222 Id. Book II, ch. 2, §13; Book II, ch. 3, §21.
223 See id. Book II, ch. 5, §45.
224 Id., Book II, ch. 5, §§25-26. He included common resources such as water in a
fountain, id. §29, and fish and wildlife. Id. §30.
225 Id. §26.
226 An alternative, proposed by both Plato and later Thomas More, among others, was
a Utopian society in which all wealth was owned collectively. See supra note 195.
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common resource.227 Why would one invest time and labor to plant crops, dig for
minerals, or engage in other economically useful activities if one could not reap
profits from the resulting increase in value?
In accepting private property and its suggested benefits, however, individuals
ceded their “perfect freedom” on land reduced to individual ownership.228 But
societies needed to decide which resources remained so fundamental to the common
welfare that more collective liberty and welfare would be lost by allowing private
ownership than society gained by privatizing those resources.229 Indeed, even as the
parent of our liberal theory of private property rights, Locke noted that private
property was justified only “where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others,”230 that commons remain so by compact,231 and that governments have the
authority to retain land in public ownership.232 Despite changing economies,
individuals did not abandon hunting and fishing on common land. Moreover,
commerce depended on navigable waters and other common “public highways.”233
Allowing private property owners to monopolize public highways and certain other
resources was inequitable234 and could do more to impair than to support growing
and evolving economies.235
The public trust doctrine thus reflects a societal determination, consistent with
natural law, about what resources should remain in common to protect liberty and
227 LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 5, §27 (“Whatsoever then he removes out of
this state that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes his Property”); §37 (individual ownership
increases land productivity); see also Freyfogle, supra note 209, at 634 & nn.8-9.
228 Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Community and the Market in Modern American Property
Law, in LAND, PROPERTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 382, 388 (John F. Richards, ed. 2002)
(noting that recognition of intensified private land use resulted in loss of community and
individual liberty values).
229 Far from advocating purely individual rights, Locke argued that government was
beneficial for the preservation of the “common good.” See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II,
ch. 9, §131.
230 See id., Book II, ch. 5, §27.
231 See id. §28.
232 See id. §35. In this section Locke, asserts that public land is held in common by
compact, but is protected by positive law.
233 This explains the intensive focus in early American law on protection of navigable
waters as public highways for common use. See, e.g., Martin, 416 U.S. at 410, 414; Pollard’s
Lessee, 44 U.S. at 229; see generally Adler, supra note 104, at 1684-86.
234 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 1269, 1295
(1993) (noting that Locke bounded his theory of private property, as a matter of equity, by
circumstances in which others have access to similar resources).
235 See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 400-01 (1991)
(arguing that common access to some resources promotes greater “scale returns” and higher
overall value); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 728-29 (1986) (citing socially optimal
resource allocation as justification for public trust theory).
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promote the common welfare. Resources such as the “air, the running waters, the
sea and the seashore” were logical candidates for common access. Land can easily
be parceled in ways that allows everyone to have a fair share for themselves. The
same is not true for a river, in which privatization of one segment could allow only
some individuals to ship their goods to market, or to charge others monopolistic fees
to do so.236 The precise legal means of doing so, for example via active public
ownership (res publicum) or through some legal concept of a commons (res
communes) reflected particular positive law applications of the natural law principle
that certain lands and resources were too valuable as a matter of common liberty to
cede to private ownership.
4. The Public Trust Doctrine as an Attribute of Sovereignty
Courts routinely describe government ownership of public trust resources as an
attribute of sovereignty.237 As emphasized by Chief Justice Taney in Martin v.
Waddell: “[W]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use ….”238 This
has been true not only for navigable waters, but also for common resources such as
wildlife239 and air.240 Legal scholars also note that the public trust doctrine has roots

236 See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 2, 6 (1994) (arguing that resources that are beyond anyone’s control,
such as air and water, are “outside the comfortable range of property,” as are resources such
as entire stocks of fish and wildlife that cannot be compartmentalized into individual parts);
see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 309 (2002) (arguing that water is unsuitable for
privatization); Epstein, supra note 25, at 415 (asserting that each river segment is worth little
unless all are subject to common ownership)..
237 See, e.g., PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 589 (states hold title to beds of navigable waters
“in their capacity as sovereigns”); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272
(2001)(ownership of lands submerged by navigable waters is “strongly identified with the
sovereign power of government,” quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552
(1981)); Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 286 (describing “the perceived character
of submerged lands, a perception which underlies and informs the principle that these lands
are tied in a unique way to sovereignty”); Pollard, 44 U.S. at 221 (providing rationale for
state trust ownership under equal footing doctrine justified because new states have the
“same rights of freedom, sovereignty, and independence” as existing states).
238 41 U.S. at 410. See also Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 49 (“the wisdom of [English] law has
placed [trust resource] in the hands of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and
regulated for the common use and benefit”), 53 (the people, through their legislatures,
manage and regulate trust resources in their sovereign capacity).
239 See Geer, 161 U.S. at 521 (control by the people “in their united sovereignty”).
240 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (“This is a suit by a state for
an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”)

34

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542342

in sovereignty, implying that sovereign trust duties cannot lightly be altered and may
not be eliminated entirely.241
Locke’s theory of government maintains that people themselves are sovereign
and cede only those rights necessary to serve necessary governmental functions.242
One of those essential functions, hence a fundamental obligation of sovereignty, is
to protect private property.243 We would not accept governmental failure to protect
private property any more than we would accept its failure to protect us from foreign
invasion. As explained above, however, Locke’s justification for private property
included several conditions designed to prevent some individuals or groups from
monopolizing key resources, which would violate the tenet that government exists
to maximize collective, not individual, freedom.244 Moreover, Locke’s definition of
the “property” government is obligated to protect is much broader than either the lay
or legal concept of property suggests. It includes “Lives, Liberties, and Estates,
which I [Locke] call by the general Name, Property.”245 Applying Locke’s logic,
individuals would not have ceded a large portion of their freedom to the government
to protect the rights of the few. Thus, government has as much of a sovereign
obligation to protect common property as it does to protect private property.
Natural law reasoning also supports the idea that the sovereign has an obligation
to enforce public trust resource protection for the common good. In a “state of
nature,” who is to ensure that individuals do not take steps to monopolize the
commons through force or occupation, even if those uses contravene natural law or
community norms? Leaving resolution of any resulting disputes to private action has
the same defect of unchecked violence and potentially biased individual judges as
those Locke identified with respect to private property.246
Likewise, who is to regulate, manage, or protect common pool resources to
ensure they are not overused or otherwise degraded or destroyed? As portrayed most
famously by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons, unregulated common
property incentivizes each individual to consume a greater portion of the resource
because the individual reaps all of the resulting profits while accompanying damage
to common resources is shared equally.247 Moreover, in many circumstances,
degradation of common pool resources is “death by a thousand cuts,” in which no
individual or small group can be identified as the singular cause of a collective

241 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 3, at 125-42; Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel,
Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian to Hale to Lamprey to
Oswego Lake, 43 VERMONT L. REV. 1 (2018); Torres & Bellinger, supra note 18, at 285-86.
But see Lazarus, supra note 25, at 633 (presenting competing perspective that public property
basis for protecting natural resources is giving way to sovereign regulatory power).
242 See supra Part II.E.3.
243 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II, ch. 9, §§123-24.
244 See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
245 LOCKE, supra note 203, Book II, ch. 9, §123 (italics and capitalization in original).
246 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
247 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (“Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all ….”).
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problem. Climate change is the most profound current example of that phenomenon,
but history holds many others.
Again, governments can adopt different positive law means to achieve the end
of protecting common trust resources. For example, government can assume formal
title to a common resource and manage it accordingly.248 Alternatively, it can decree
that certain resources, such as wildlife, are inherently incapable of private
ownership, but that use of those resources can be regulated for the public benefit.249
Another option is to allow for usufructuary property rights in defined portions of
common resources such as water, but with ownership or public trust oversight held
by the common government.250 The precise form chosen as a matter of positive law
is less important than the proper assumption by the government of its sovereign
obligation to manage and protect public trust resources.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF NATURAL LAW FOR THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
Prior Appropriation identified several core principles against which to evaluate
the legitimacy of claims asserted by western property rights advocates based on prior
appropriation. Although these principles are not equally applicable to claims by
environmental advocates based on the public trust doctrine, parallel analysis requires
that all be analyzed here as well with respect to the public trust doctrine as well.
These principles help to explain how the public trust doctrine developed in the past,
but they also suggest guidelines for its future evolution.
A. Temporal and Societal Context
The first principle from Prior Appropriation is that natural law has not been a
fixed concept throughout history. It reflects the political and social context of the
time.251 Thus, assertions that natural law justifies extensions of prior appropriation
doctrine or public trust doctrine, or alternatively that such extensions would upset
longstanding legal expectations or contravene democratic principles, “must be
analyzed and applied in our current political and social context, not through the lens
of a past era.”252
In the case of prior appropriation, as applied to grazing or other resources,
federal positive law governing the public lands makes perfect sense.253 Federal
multiple use management of common resources reflects the current social and
248 This is the legal form used for navigable waters, in which English and American law
distinguishes between jus publicum and jus privatum, with different associated rights and
obligations. See Couer d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 286; Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-14.
249 This is what the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately decided with respect to wildlife.
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 329-36.
250 See Nat’l Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 712.
251 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 778-79.
252 Id.
253 See id. at 802-04.
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political context in which large segments of the public use public lands for recreation
and other common uses, while smaller numbers of profit-seeking individuals and
businesses use public lands for more traditional resource extraction purposes. To the
extent that natural law is relevant to federal land policy, it justifies societal decisions
to retain some land and resources in the public domain.254 U.S. positive law supports
that regime. Thus, although natural law would also support making public grazing
land available for appropriation, natural law ranch advocates bear the burden of
convincing the key decisionmaker, Congress, to modify positive law to do so.
Likewise, to the extent that the public trust doctrine has origins in natural law,
it should be analyzed and applied through the lens of contemporaneous natural
resource use and values. The applicable principle of natural law is that, in forming
civil societies, individuals ceded to government the authority to make certain
resources available for private property, but to reserve other resources for common
use and protection.255 This applies regardless of whether one interprets natural law
from a perspective of liberty,256 economic efficiency, or both.257 Collective freedom
and economic welfare are both maximized by holding some resources in common
rather than privatizing them. As with all concepts of natural law, different societies
implement that concept differently through their positive law as appropriate to their
circumstances, but natural law remains a tool to evaluate the justice of those choices
and modes of implementation.
In early, sparsely settled societies, there may have been little or no need to use
positive law to protect common resources that had been shared through local custom
and practice.258 That changed as land and resource use intensified, as competition
for resources increased, and as individuals or groups sought to monopolize what was
formerly common.259 Thus, the Roman public trust doctrine evolved in response to
conflicts caused when wealthy citizens built coastal villas that interfered with
traditional access by local fishers.260 As manifested in Magna Carta, the Charter of
the Forests, and in common law,261 the English public trust doctrine protected
“ancient rights” to common resource access against the intrusion of the Norman
monarchs. The significant focus on navigable waters as the principle but not
exclusive contested resource262 made sense for an island nation that relied so heavily
on maritime commerce.263 The same was true in the British Colonies and later the

See supra Part II.E.
supra Part II.E.
256 See Freyfogle, supra note 228, at 395.
257 See Epstein, supra note 25, at 414-15.
258 See Rose, supra note 236, at 13-14.
259 See Freyfogle, supra note 228, at 386-88.
260 See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 19, at 49-51.
261 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
262 See Russell, supra note 44, at 634-35 (describing ongoing controversy over Acts of
Parliament that enriched aristocrats by enclosing commons at the expense of commoners).
263 See Wilkinson, supra note 25; Adler, supra note 104 .
254

255 See
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United States, which depended heavily on the use and protection of navigable waters
for travel and trade, for subsistence resources, and for national defense.264
In the modern world, resource conflicts have changed and intensified. We face
problems never before encountered, some of which could not have been imagined
when we entered any particular social contract. Climate change is the clearest and
most compelling current example, but it is only one of many with which courts asked
to modify or extend the public trust doctrine have struggled in recent decades. Given
the common law nature of the public trust doctrine, courts and legislatures are free
to apply it to other appropriate resources so long as those applications are consistent
with otherwise applicable principles of positive law in the jurisdiction.265
In response to this challenge, both state and federal American courts recognized
early in our history that narrow geographic limitations to the concept of navigability
that may have applied in England were not appropriate to the geography of North
America.266 More recently, courts in diverse U.S. jurisdictions have recognized that
the public trust doctrine is grounded in broader principles than protection of the
traditional “triad” of navigability doctrine resources (navigation, commerce, and
fishing). In expanding public trust protections to include ecological and aesthetic
resources and values, for example, the California Supreme Court wrote:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is
the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.267
Public trust cases have involved other common resources that are explained by the
same natural law reasoning, such as wildlife,268 wetlands,269 and public parklands.270
The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated similar principles regarding protection
of the atmosphere and other common resources with respect to regional air pollution,
but clothed in parens patriae language rather than the public trust doctrine.271
Extension of public trust principles to the atmosphere would appear to fit squarely
within these principles. It is a common resource that is inappropriate for private
ownership. It confers common economic and other welfare, including preservation
of life itself. Allowing some interests to jeopardize atmospheric integrity impedes
264 See

Wilkinson, supra note 25; Adler, supra note 104.
This includes the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without
due process and just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See infra Part III.B.
266 See The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443; Carson, 2 Binn. 475; Adler, supra
note104, at 1656-59.
267 Marks, 491 P.2d at 380.
268 See Geer, 161 U.S at 522-29.
269 See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wisc. 1972).
270 See Gould, 350 Mass. 410.
271 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230.
265
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individual and collective liberty and welfare, and one the very ends of government
Locke identified is “mutual preservation” of those collective values.272
B. Duty to Obey Positive Law
The second relevant principle from Prior Appropriation is that “individuals
must respect and obey the positive law of the society in which they live, because that
is the foundation on which all civil society is based.” 273 That principle was
particularly relevant to property rights asserted by natural law ranch advocates
because they used civil disobedience (sometimes in armed confrontations) and
overtly asserted that they were not bound by federal law.274 Natural law ranch
advocates are entitled to argue for changes in federal land law and policy consistent
with their understanding of natural law, but unless they prevail in those arguments
through legitimate political or judicial process, they either must obey the law or
accept the legal consequences of their actions.275 Proponents of the extension of the
public trust doctrine or other assertions of fundamental environmental rights have
resorted to civil disobedience as well, however,276 and those actions should be
evaluated according to the same principles.
In the United States, individual reliance on theistic versions of natural law to
violate positive law is also limited through the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment277 and the Oath or Affirmation Clause in Article VI.278 Religious
doctrine cannot confer a legally enforceable source of natural law unless a principle
is so universally accepted or independently enshrined in positive law that it has
become the law of the land.279 Rather, the federal and state constitutions are the
exclusive source of law governing judicial review of duly adopted legislation.
Natural law principles, however, may guide cases not addressed directly by

272 See LOCKE, supra note 211, Book II., ch. 9, §123. See also id. at Book II, ch. 1, §§3,
6 (admonishing that “no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions,” and that government power is designed to protect against violations of that
principle); Book II, ch. 9, §130 (providing that people part with natural liberty “as the good,
prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require”) (capitalization in original).
273 Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779.
274 See id. at 743-45.
275 See id. at 756.
276 See id. at 745.
277 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
278 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3.
279 A clear example is that some of the Ten Commandments, such as “Thou shalt not
kill” or “Thou shalt not steal” are universally recognized tenets of civil law, although subject
to varying implementation. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 760-65. Early Puritan
settlers recognized the distinction between those portions of the Decalogue that address an
individual’s relationship to God as inappropriate for civil law implementation, and those
portions that address an individual’s duties in a civil society, which can be the proper subject
of civil law. See JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
SOUL: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY 206 (2012).
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legislation or constitutional provisions, or help jurists fill in gaps in legislation or
constitutional provisions.280
Thus, to the extent that natural law ranch advocates rely on personal religious
beliefs to justify property rights, those beliefs are not a valid source of legal rights.
Congress rejected those assertions through legislation adopted under its Property
Clause power, as did the federal courts in interpreting those statutes.281 Some faithbased groups support environmental protection agendas,282 and scholars and others
have analyzed religious texts regarding the extent to which their teachings support
proper stewardship of natural resources.283 I know of no claims, however, that
theistic principles should dictate environmental or natural resources law directly,
and certainly not that they should override positive law.
C. Manner of Implementation
The third and final principle identified in Prior Appropriation is that the system
of law adopted in our constitutional system of government dictates and limits the
manner in which concepts of natural law may be used or asserted.284 This implicates
both constitutional limits on government action, and institutional or process-based
requirements designed to ensure accountability and democratic governance.
1. Constitutional Limits
In the case of the public trust doctrine, the key constitutional issue involves
applicability of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution that prohibit unlawful taking
of private property without due process and just compensation.285 As is true with
See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 770-78; Babcock, supra note 30.
See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, Part II.B.1.b.
282 For example, Pope John Paul II released a statement Peace with God Creator, Peace
with All Creation, in which environmental protection is framed a moral issue where all are
called
upon
to
do
their
part.
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paulii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19891208_xxiii-world-day-for-peace.html;
For examples in other religious traditions, see, e.g., http://aytzim.org/resources/educationalmaterials/155abjeo; https://www.buddhistinsightnetwork.org/dia-buddhist-environmentalorganizations; https://www.greenmuslims.org/; https://ldsearthstewardship.org/.
283 See generally TORAH OF THE EARTH: EXPLORING 4,000 YEARS OF ECOLOGY IN
JEWISH THOUGHT (Arthur Waskow, ed. 2000); see also David Horell & Anna Davis,
Engaging the Bible in GCSE and A Level of Religious Studies: Environmental Studies as a
Test Case, BRITISH J. RELIGIOUS EDUC. Vol. 36, No. 1, 72, 78 (2014); Quiang Luo, Daoism
and Environmental Sustainability-A Completely Different Way of Thinking, Proceedings of
International Workshop on Sustainable City Region, 164-171; Christopher Key Chapple,
Hinduism, Jainism, and Ecology, The Forum on Religion and Ecology Yale.
http://fore.yale.edu/religion/hinduism/; Donald K. Swearer Buddhism and Ecology:
Challenge and Promise, The Forum on Religion and Ecology Yale.
http://fore.yale.edu/religion/buddhism/.
284 See Prior Appropriation, supra note 1, at 779-80.
285 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend IV, §1. See Grant, supra note 25.
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virtually every other aspect of public trust law, this issue has been hotly debated.
Some scholars caution that public trust protection might limit applicability of the
doctrine or require compensation to the extent that those protections impair private
property.286 Others believe public trust protection is authorized under long-accepted
background principles of law, either generally or with respect to specific categories
of common property.287
The takings issue has been mitigated to some extent by the familiar “bundle of
sticks” concept of property law,288 under which public trust protection need not
prevent entirely the privatization of land that contains common pool resources. For
example, one can own a parcel of land through which a herd of deer migrates. Under
American wildlife law, the landowner does not “own” the herd of deer, which is now
considered an “unownable” resource under U.S. law.289 The landowner can,
however, exercise the property right to limit access to private property for purposes
of hunting those deer, leaving them available for hunting on public or other private
lands. The landowner can also reduce individual deer to possession and ownership
by successfully hunting them, subject to any applicable state regulations regarding
season, bag limits, age and size, etc. Likewise, in the context of the public trust over
navigable waters, American courts have accepted the distinction between jus
privatum and jus publicum title to the same property, to serve different purposes;
and the federal government retains a navigational servitude in those same waters.290
Early American trust doctrine cases involving shellfish beds illustrate the utility
of this more fine-tuned approach to the tension between resources that have more
value as a common pool and those that are more efficiently made available as private
property. Wild shellfish collected in tidal waters clearly fall within the geographic
scope of the English common law public trust. Preserving those resources for
common access promoted collective freedom and welfare, particularly in regions of
Colonial America in which fishing and foraging for shellfish was essential to
subsistence.291 Cases such as Arnold v. Mundy292 and Gough v. Bell,293 however,
involved the rights of individuals to plant oysters in specified parcels of tidal lands
for which title for other purposes had been granted to others. Those circumstances
implicate the Lockean idea that resources should be available for private ownership
so that individuals may reap the profits from their labor and skill in tilling the land
and nursing their crops to harvest.
286 See

Grant, supra note 25; Huffman, supra note 25, at 528, 558-59.
See Rieser, supra note 235; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. LAW. REV. 1433,
1447-50 (1993).; Freyfogle, supra note 234, at 96-97; Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations
Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996).
288 See Arnold, supra note 236, at 289-91 (explaining but critiquing “bundle of sticks”
metaphor).
289 See Hughes, 441 U.S. 322.
290 See Rieser, supra note 235, at 398 & n.27.
291 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 414.
292 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
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Planting oysters in tidal waters thus falls in a grey area between those resources
subject to natural law principles justifying private property and natural law
principles justifying common access. That explains why courts struggled with the
applicability of public trust principles to those facts and circumstances. It also
explains the ultimate resolution that state legislatures, as elected representatives of
the people as sovereign, should resolve such middle ground cases of public trust
management as a matter of positive law, and as appropriate to the particular
circumstances of that jurisdiction. Indeed, the resolution upheld by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Gough v. Bell was to allow exclusive oyster beds subject to state
regulation.294 That is consistent with the manner in which states regulate the
harvesting of other fish and wildlife, and reflects a rational judgment about how to
balance private property and public access to the common pool resource of tidal
areas suitable for shellfish harvest.
The issue becomes more challenging to the extent that government seeks to
extend public trust protection to resources not formerly subject to protection, or that
have not previously been recognized as part of the trust “corpus”. How takings
jurisprudence applies to those assertions may depend on the degree to which the
doctrine inhered in particular forms of property historically.295 For example, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the federal navigation servitude is not subject to the
strictures of the takings clause.296 Although the navigation servitude cases pre-date
Lucas, they reflect the fact that the servitude exists as a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty that predates any private property rights to the beds of navigable waters.
Indeed, Illinois Central involved the takings issue as an important but oftenneglected subsidiary issue. Arguably, the real dispute between the majority and the
dissent involved takings rather than a fundamental dispute about American public
trust law. Justice Field, who was “normally a staunch defender of individual liberty
and private property,”297 sanctioned compensation to the extent that the railroad
company incurred actual property losses as a result of the legislature’s withdrawal
of portions of the original grant, and remanded for a determination of the company’s
riparian rights to wharf out.298 In dissent, Justice Shiras did not disagree with the
majority’s statement of public rights in navigable waters, but saw no immediate
violation of public rights and would have required the legislature to wait to see of
the railroad acting in derogation of those rights and to exercise its rights of eminent
domain if it believed necessary.299

22 N.J.L. at 456-61.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-32 (1992)
(holding that the takings issue turns on the nature and extent of property loss and the extent
to which existing limitations to protect common interests restrict title as a “background
principle” of law). A full analysis of the takings issue is beyond the scope of this article but
has been addressed elsewhere. See Grant, supra note 25.
296 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
297 See Epstein, supra note 25, at 423.
298 Ill. Central R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 439-57.
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Thus, one obvious solution to the takings problem would be for government to
compensate landowners for any loss of property rights caused by affording public
trust protection to a resource previously not deemed subject to the trust, that is, to
use eminent domain power to expand the trust corpus, just as government must use
eminent domain to expand its land holdings to build a new road. That solution would
be extremely expensive, however, presenting a large disincentive for budgetconscious governments and a tax-averse public to act. Property rights advocates
would respond that this would pose a useful, if not essential, check on the tendency
of government to expand public trust protections. Government would expand the
trust corpus only if it believed that the value to the public was sufficient to incur the
accompanying costs.
Imposing this cost on government, however, arguably violates the whole idea
of the public trust doctrine, particularly as informed by natural law. Professor
Epstein noted that the failure of government to administer the public trust properly
by allowing private use—particularly monopolistic use—of trust resources
constitutes a kind of reverse eminent domain, an unlawful private taking of public
property without due process or just compensation.300 If one accepts the idea that
people never agreed to cede that portion of their liberty with respect to natural
resources that are fundamental to life, health, and welfare, such as water and air or
basic environmental integrity, why should the public need to “buy back” those
resources from private property owners who, by virtue of having acquired other
property rights, gain monopolistic or other significant control over them?
The core problem, then, is distinguishing between those resources that should
be available for private appropriation, and those intended to be reserved in common.
As explained above, relying exclusively on those resources that have historically
been protected by positive law does not solve the problem, and leads to
inappropriately narrow results, because public trust law evolved only as needed to
address particular problems relevant at particular times and in particular societies.301
The challenge is where and how to apply the public trust doctrine to new, often
unforeseen problems. This is directly analogous to the “Griswold problem” in Ninth
Amendment jurisprudence.302 The Ninth Amendment may have reserved
unenumerated rights that warrant constitutional protection, but if they are not
enumerated, how are we to know what counts? The public trust component of the
social contract may have reserved certain kinds of resources for common use and
benefit, but how are we to know which count?
Although the idea of an atmospheric public trust has generated considerable
controversy,303 it actually seems to present on of the clearest cases for trust
protection. That is not so simply because “air” is mentioned expressly in the
Institutes of Justinian. As others have noted, even to the extent that the Institutes
accurately portray Roman law, the meaning of this reference is not clear, and there
300 See
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is little evidence of its implementation in the Roman Empire.304 It is because the
atmosphere is so clearly a fundamental and essential common resource that it is
incapable of being divided for purposes of ownership. If navigable waterways merit
public trust protection, how can the same not be true for the atmosphere? Moreover,
to the extent that public trust protection is a sovereign obligation analogous to
national defense or the protection of private property,305 preventing catastrophic
climate change appears to be a simple case rather than a close call.
When the issues are not clear, the harder questions are who should decide what
resources warrant trust protection, what level of protection to provide, and through
what positive law methods. Those issues are addressed in the following section.
2. Institutional and Process Limits
One argument against the applicability of vague, unwritten concepts of natural
law to confer such wide-reaching power in the face of changing circumstances, at
least in the United States and other republican forms of government, is that it
threatens principles of representative democracy and allows unbridled judicial
activism.306 Reliance on natural law principles that are foundational to our concept
of government to inform important decisions about law and policy, however, says
nothing about who has the power to make those decisions, when, and under what
circumstances. In fact, important structural checks inherent in the separation of
powers built into the U.S. Constitution limit the force of this critique.307
First, judicial application of the public trust doctrine is subject to legislative
discretion. In the case of the federal government’s residual authority to protect
navigability, federal courts apply the federal navigational servitude doctrine, but
defer to the plenary discretion of Congress in deciding which waterways require
protection or improvement for purposes of navigability, and through what means.308
Similarly, because the states retain sovereignty over traditional public trust property,
state legislatures have discretion to dispose of trust properties so long as those grants
are consistent with or designed to serve the purposes of the trust.309 Thus, state
legislatures remain free to check inappropriate state court actions under the public
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306 See Huffman, supra note 25; Cohen, supra note 28, at 252.
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trust doctrine.310 Whether the Ninth Amendment or other authority establishes a
substantive floor on state public trust doctrine responsibility remains to be seen.311
Second, legislative or executive branch actions pursuant to the public trust
doctrine, or actions allegedly in violation of public trust principles, remain subject
to judicial review in both federal and state courts (depending on where jurisdiction
is found appropriate); and state judicial decisions are subject to review in the U.S.
Supreme Court for violation of federal constitutional law. In particular, all
interpretations and applications of the public trust doctrine are subject to checks
under the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of many states. Given that any
federal authority over public trust resources in navigable waters reflects a cession of
those aspects of the trust affecting interstate and foreign commerce, any federal
exercise of trust authority is bounded by the scope of the Commerce Clause.312
Moreover, as explained above, although federal control over navigability affecting
private title to lands beneath navigable waters require no compensation because that
title is held subject to the federal navigation servitude, assertions of public trust
authority over other public trust resources are subject to takings scrutiny, whether or
not that scrutiny ultimately requires compensation.313 Finally, some state
constitutions have express provisions defining public trust resources and the
principles according to which they must be managed.314
In short, the answer to issues of institutional accountability in making and
implementing public trust doctrine decisions is not to throw up our collective hands
and abandon the trust. It is to ensure, as we do with analogous challenging public
decisions, that our system of constitutional checks and balances works as intended.
V. CONCLUSION
At the outset of his classic The History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell
asked: “Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of
our innate love of order?”315 The same question may be asked about natural law,
with a slightly modified response. Is there really such a thing as natural law, or do
we believe in it only because of our innate love of justice?
We live in a society governed largely by positive law. That includes our federal
and state constitutions, federal and state statutes and regulations, and federal and
state judicial decisions that form the body of our common law. Yet none of our
public decision makers who formulate and implement positive law, whether
310 Professor Babcock appears to agree in arguing that, even if the public trust doctrine
is a “legal fiction,” it is a useful fiction in allowing judges to use common law to fill gaps in
trust doctrine implementation pending legislative action displacing that common law. See
Babcock, supra note 30, at 395.
311 See supra Part II.C.
312 See id.
313 See supra Part III.C.1.
314 See, e.g., Robinson Twp., 83 A.2d 901; Ariz. Center for Law in the Public Interest,
837 P.2d 158.
315 RUSSELL, supra note 44, at xiii.
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legislative, judicial, or executive branch, write on a blank slate. Arguably, secular
natural law establishes principles of justice we can use to help form positive law
doctrines, or to test whether they comport with our basic values.
As was true with respect to prior appropriation, natural law helps to inform the
origins, meaning, and content of the public trust doctrine. It can help us to interpret
and apply the doctrine in ways that are most consistent with our political heritage
and system of government, and the principles of liberty and welfare they were
designed to promote and protect.
Prior Appropriation assumed that natural law claims used to support the two
doctrines were inconsistent and needed to be resolved. In a large sense, however, the
above analysis shows that the issues in Part I (Prior Appropriation) and Part II (The
Public Trust Doctrine) merge. Both involve the degree to which, in forming civil
societies, it was desirable to make all property and all resources available for private
appropriation and exclusive use and control, or to retain some kinds of property and
resources in common. As shown above, both the appropriation and public trust
concepts are supported by the Lockean ideals that helped to inform the principles on
which our constitutional system of government was based.
Locke and his followers, including the Founders of the American Republic,
believed deeply in the value of private property because it can enhance bot individual
liberty and collective welfare through economic efficiency and productivity. That
explains the concept of appropriation. But Locke also admonished that private
property should not be used in ways that harm other individuals, or the common
welfare. He also acknowledged that some resources can—and should—be retained
in common to enhance and protect collective liberty and common welfare. Which
resources best fit into which category is a more challenging inquiry. That question
is largely determined by positive law as appropriate to different societies and
circumstances, but those choices can and should be informed by the natural law
principles on which they are premised.
In this context, natural law ranch advocates and public trust doctrine advocates
make similar claims, but from opposite sides of this spectrum. Ranch advocates
argue for extension of prior appropriation doctrine to include property rights to
grazing and other resources on public lands. Federal positive law has rejected that
idea in favor of an alternative system of making those resources available through
grazing leases and federal regulation to protect the common values of the resource.
It is difficult to see how that balance violates any basic principle of natural law.
Public trust advocates argue for an extension of the public trust doctrine to
encompass the atmosphere to combat catastrophic global climate change, and other
resources they deem essential to the common welfare. Positive law does not yet
support all of those claims, but unlike the claims of natural law ranch advocates,
neither does it preclude them. Although those claims may pose difficult policy
choices, they are consistent with, if not fully supported by, principles of natural law.
Thus, the natural law underpinnings of the public trust doctrine allow flexibility
in the manner in which a state or other jurisdiction interprets the scope of the doctrine
(the resources to which it applies) and the manner in which the trust is administered
(who may access resources and under what conditions). So long as made consistently

46

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542342

with constitutional and other applicable positive law in the jurisdiction, those
judgments can change over time as circumstances change and as knowledge and
understanding progress. Conceptually, this is no different than other ways in which
different jurisdictions implement natural law differences as appropriate to their
circumstances and community values but bound by a unifying minimum principle.
The idea of an atmospheric public trust is one good example, and perhaps the
most important example of our times, of inherent flexibility in the public trust
doctrine. In accepting early in history that “the air” was a shared resource essential
to the welfare of all of humanity, neither the Romans nor those who conceptualized
the English common law doctrine could have foreseen the dramatic rise in
greenhouse gas emissions and the impact it would have on the atmosphere. The
sovereign obligation to protect and manage the collective resource, remains,
however, despite drastically changing circumstances. Indeed, that obligation is
arguably at its highest when those changes jeopardize the resource—and human
welfare—so catastrophically.
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